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ABSTRACT

On the Effectiveness of Agricultural Land-Use Controls
by
Eric Tarquin Marnell, Master of Science
Utah State University, 1983
Major Professor:
Department:

Dr. W. Cris Lewis
Economics

Land resources are a valuable resource in the economic system.
There exists considerable controversy surrounding the allocation of land
into the competing land uses.
agricultural land resources.

At the heart of this controversy are

The purpose of this paper is to investi-

gate, first theoretically and second empirically, the effectiveness of
controls placed on land use to keep land in agricultural production.
A theoretical conclusion is reached as to whether the free market
or 1 and-use controls all ocate 1 and resources more efficiently.

An

empirical model is formulated to explain changes in the quantity of
agricultural 1 and as a function of several hypothesized explanatory
variables, one of which is a land-control dummy variable to measure the
effectiveness of agricultural land-use controls.
The general conclusion reached is that for the most part, the
controls have been ineffective.

Where they have been effective in

i nfl uenci ng 1and-use a 11 ocati on, questions sti 11 exist concerning the
cost imposed upon society from the control influenced 1and a 11 ocati on.
(101 pages)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The conversion of agricultural

land to urban and other uses

continues t o be a topic of considerable controversy.

The heart of the

controversy is embodied in arguments concerning the national supply of
agricultural land, especially cropland.

With a total crop l and ba se in

the United States of approximately 450 million acres, high stakes are
involved for the production from that cropland represents a large input
i nto and has a large effect on our economic system.

Few can oppose the

argument that this valuable resource has to be allocated efficiently.
However,

di sagreements exist as to what is meant by an efficient

a 11 ocati on of 1 and.
The purpose of the thesis is to study the effectiveness of
agr i cultural land-use controls in stopping or reducing conversion losses
from t he t ota 1 crop 1and base.

The purpose of this introductory chapter

is to present arguments for and against agricultural land-use controls.
A conclusion is reached as to whether the control -influenced land
all otation is theoretically superior to a market allocation of 1 and.
The Market Allocation
--The goal of any economic system is,

of Land
whether it be social is tic or

capitalistic in structure, to allocate resources (i.e., land, labor, and
capital) to meet some predefined objectives.

In a competitive market

facing competing objectives for resources, it can be shown that such
decisions will lead to an allocation of resources which is Pareto
efficient in the absence of externalities, cell ecti ve goods, and any
monopolistic or monopsonistic elements.
The concept of Pareto efficiency has one drawback; it takes as
given the existing income distribution, thereby, ignoring any equity
considerations.

However,

accounting for equity is not straightforward

for who is truly qualified to determine the most equitable income
distribution?

With less than perfect knowledge about the effects of

income equalization measures on work effort (it depends on the initial
assumptions about the marginal utility of income and the marginal
utility of 1 ei sure), equity considerations reduce to va 1 ue judgements
about what the distribution of income should be.

Taken too far,

attempts to achieve an "equitable" distribution of income may reduce
work effort and income.
efficiently.

The market will therefore all ocate resources

Pareto efficiency is a powerful operational concept aiding

the resource rea 11 ocati on process.
The decentralized decisions inherent in a competitive market will
result in almost continual resource reallocation.
expand while others decline.

Some industries

For example, Table 1 illustrates, for the

most part, market induced employment changes for selected industries
between June, 1972 and June, 1982.

While the social system is sensitive

to the problems associated with these economic adjustments, they are
viewed as necessary to the efficient operation of the economic system.
With economi c efficiency, resources or factors of production are allowed
to move to their highest value or best use.

Decentralized market

TABLE 1.
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT, JUNE (1972) TO JUNE (1982)
Emp 1oyment

Industry
1.

011 and Gas Extraction

2.

Medical Instruments and Supplies

3.

Newspapers

June (1972)

June (1982)

1972·1982 Changes

264,000

717,400

93,200

161,300

+453. 000
+ 68,600

377,100

425.300

+ 48,200

4.

Engineering and Scientific Instruments

64,300

76.000

+ 12,000

5.

Copper Ores

38.900

24,300

• 14,000

6.

Highway and Street Construction

363,800

251,800

·112,000

7.

Blast Furnaces and Basic Steel Products

586,200

410,500

·184,000

8.

Motor Vehicles and Equipment

896,400

709.900

·186 ,400

SOURCES: U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings: September 1972, Vol . 19, No 3.
U.S., Department of labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings :
----

September 1982, Yo 1. 29, No. 6.

w
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decisions facilitate this process by allowing individuals to maximize
welfare and firms to maximize profit.
Economics of Land
To debate the issue of the optimal use of a particular resource
such as 1 and requires agreement on the objective function to be maximized.

It is submitted that the objective is to arrive at the alloca-

tion of land that maximizes the aggregate value of all land rents.

The

economic rent on any resource wil 1 reflect its net contribution to
national income for the time period specified and its worth to society.
By maximizing rents, the objective of maximizing national income is
achieved.
To achieve the objective, land is continually being converted and
reconverted among uses as market conditions change.

This is in response

to price signals generated in the land market reflecting society's landuse preferences.

With 1 and resource mobi 1 ity, resources are free to

move to their highest and best use.

Therefore, the reallocation of land

among the various land uses that would take place in the market is
optimal since the objective of maximizing national income is achieved.
The market allocation is optimal (provided there are no significant
distortions), since society it is able to capture larger rents (may or
may not imply speculation) by foregoing land uses that yield a lower
rent and by adopting those land uses with a larger rent.
Arguments for

~

Nonmarket Land A11 ocati on

Agricultural land-use controls substitute government allocation for
the market process.

They are a nonmarket tool

initiated in the

political arena that attempts to allocate or influence the allocation of
land among the competing land uses.

Many arguments are offered in

support of a nonmarket allocation of agricultural land.
argument relates
agricultural

to externalities.

The first

Open space associated with

land use may provide positive aesthetic benefits or

externalities for urban residents.
A second argument is that the market may not guarantee an adequate
supp 1y of agri cultura 1 1 and.

Recent 1y, 1 arge conversion 1 osses from the

tota 1 crop 1and base have been reported.l

If agri cultura 1 1and supp 1 i es

are decreasing, possible food shortages may result.

If growth trends in

world population persist along with the inadequacy of the vast majority
of underdeveloped countries to meet their own domestic food requirements
for self-sufficiency, severe world food shortages may result.

Under

this scenario, the United States caul d have reduced the food shortage
impact by insuring an "adequate" supply of agricultural land that would
make the export of larger quantities of agricultural products practical
while at the same time limiting the impact on the domestic food market.
Another argument for agricultural land-use controls is the alleged
difference between private and public 1and holder discount rates.

If

private holder discount rates are greater than public holder rates,
private holders have a shorter planning horizon.

This implies private

holders are acting out of self-interest against the wishes of society,
which the public holders are representing by a lower discount rate.
Private holder discount rates do not reflect social time preference.

------ys~~--R~b~rt E. Coughlin and John c. Keene, eds., Nation a 1
Agricultural Lands Study. The Protection of Farmland: A Reference for
State and Locar-tOv~ts:-!Amherst, Massachusetts: Reg10na 1 Sc1 ence
ResearCh rnsiTtute, 1981 ), p. 16.
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Therefore, the private holder rate would underallocate land to decisions
facilitate this process by allowing individuals to maximize agricultural
production, thereby ignoring the preferences of society.
goods are another argument for agricultural
Collective goods have two fundamental

Cell ecti ve

1 and-use controls.
1 l the

characteristics:

impossibility of excluding consumers who do not pay for the good in
question (nonexclusion), and 2) consumption by one consumer occurs
without reducing the quantity of the good available for other consumers
(nonrival consumption).

The market will not allocate the socially

optimal quantity because of these two characteristics.

If local

economic benefits derived from an agricultural economy may be classified
as a call ecti ve good, the market will not all ocate an efficient amount
of land for agricultural land use.

Agricultural land-use controls are

justified to allocate land to agriculture if collective goods exist with
agricultural land use.
If agricultural product and factor markets are not absolutely
competitive, monopoly and/or monopsony elements exist.

Economics has

demonstrated how the pricing behavior of monopolists and monopsonists
differ from that of the competitive market.

For monopolists and

monopsonists, price is determined as output decisions are reached.

With

respect to the land market, agricultural land-use controls might offset
the socially inefficient pricing behavior.

A second best sol uti on may

be obtai ned.
Another argument is presented with the belief that food is a merit
good. Food is considered a merit good if it is believed to be such a
basic human need that the private land market should not be allowed to
determine the acreage devoted to food production. Food and fiber should

be provided to all as a "right" and should not be governed by market
criteria . 2

Instead, nonmarket criteria should allocate acreage for food

production .
The last argument stresses the point that once conversion of
agricultural land to other uses has taken place conversion back to
agriculture is nearly impossible (irreversibility).
Against Nonmarket A11 ocati on
Externalities are associated with some agricultural uses of land,
but most of these are negative externalities that are supporting the
notion that too much, not too little, land is in agricultural use.
These negative externa lti ties inc 1 ude the 1 eachi ng of po 11 utants from
chemica 1 ferti 1 i zers and organic waste into underground acqui fers and
surface watercourses, noise and odors from dairy and feed 1 ot
operations, and the interference of farm machinery on roadways with
faster moving vehicles such as automobiles.

These can result in

marginal social cost exceeding price with the conclusion that too many
resources are being devoted to farm production.
Open space may provide positive aesthetic benefits for urban
residents.

However, other aesthetic benefits may exist.

For examp 1e,

housing developments can generate positive externalities.

Urban

residents in less affluent neighborhoods may drive through expensive
housing districts, deriving pleasure from observing a quality of housing
superior to their own.
If negative externalities predominate for agricultural uses of

-----2~~l~~~~h-B.

Gardner, "The Economics of Agri cu 1 tura 1 Land Preservation," American Journa 1 of Agri cu ltura 1 Economics (Dec. 1977) : 1029.
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1 and, the externalities argument forwarded for agricultural land-use
controls is weak.

The valuation of all aesthetic preferences involved

would be useful so that comparisons could be made.3
Arguments suggesting the future supply of agricultural 1and may be
greatly reduced and unable to meet food requirements are lacking
sufficient evidence.

Projecting future economic activity is highly

inaccurate. One only has to look at the poor performances of economists
in forecasting future Gross National Product to see this.

With respect

to the supply of agricultural land, a simple example can be generated by
citing trends that, when extrapolated far enough, result in a zero
farmland base or at 1east an "inadequate" farmland base at some future
date.

To assess the future on the basis of an extrapolation of any

historic trend is in error.

Such an extrapolation will show what will

happen if the conditions that brought about the trend in the first place
continue into the future.

To illustrate the errors inherent to that

process, past data (1930-1978) on total cropland and agricultural labor
were each regressed on time.

The estimated equations were used to make

an extrapolation of future values.

Trends in the agricultural land base

are summarized in Table 2.
The estimated equation for agricultural land is:
(1)

AL

=

476.02- 0.24T

where AL is total cropland in mill ions of acres, and Tis a time index

-----30~~-i-d-S-.- Brookshire, Berry C. I ves, and Wi 11 i am D. Schu 1 ze, "The
Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 3 (1976) : 325-346.

--- -

TABLE 2
CROPLAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-78
Cropland 1n Crops
Year

Total 4

Change 4

Total Cropland
Percentage
Change

Tota 1a

Change 4

Percentage
Change

1910

320

--

--

437

1920

368

48

15 . 0

380

43

9.8

1930

382

14

3.8

480

--

-2.7

1940

368

-14

-3.7

467

-13

2. 4

1950

377

9

2.4

478

+11

2.4

1959

359

-18

-4.8

458

-20

-4.1

1969

333

-26

- 7.2

472

+14

3.1

1978

361

+28

+8 . 4

454

-18

-3 . 8

SOURCES :
U.S. , Depar tment of Agriculture, Agricultural
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 419.

Statistics:

198D,
--

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Agr1culture Su!Miary
and State Data : 1978, Vol. 1, pt. 51, Table 1, (WaS'Jil"'nnton. D. C. : Gover~
P'rTnfTri'gD~ 1'9ii0r; p.

1.

"'
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(i.e. , T

1 for 1930, T

=

=

2 for 1931, etc . ).4

The equation is an The

new e xtrapolation suggesting a long term trend reduction of 240,000
acres of land per year f r om the cropland ba se.

Given the c ropland base

of the United States, the country waul d run out of cropland in about
2000 years.
The trend equation for farm labor is :
(2)

FL

13 , 070- 191.6T

where FL is the agricultural 1 abor force measured in thousands of
workers, and Tis the same time index used in equation (1 ).5

The trend

has been a reduction in agricultural labor of about 191,600 workers per
year.

Th i s trend, if projected, would have the country running out of

agricultural workers in the year 1998.

The trends implied by these

relationships suggest that by 1998, no workers wil 1 be farming 459
million acres of land!
In the market society determines the amount of 1and to be devoted
to a particular use, such as agriculture, by voting with dollar votes.
These dollar votes are reflected in land-use prices.

A higher land-use

price implies that society is attaching more dollar votes to a land use.
If society desires more 1 and in agricultural production more dollar
votes waul d be devoted to agricultural 1 and use which waul d in turn
increase agricultural land prices.

Through market prices, society will

determine the optima 1 quantity of 1 and for each competing 1 and use in

-----4Th~-~~~~~ions were estimated from annual data. See Cris W. Lewis
and Eric T. Marnell, "Agricultural Land Use and Land-Use Controls," Utah
Science, Summer 1982. If estimated from the data in Table 2, the
agricultural land equation becomes: AL = 477.8 - 0.676T. This equation
is suggestive of a long term trend reduction of 676,000 acres per year,
with the country running out of agricultural land in about 700 years,
p. 52.
5 rbid.
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order to ma ximize welfar e.
Agri c ultural land-use controls stand in contrast to this process.
They ignore the market generated price signals reflecting society's
land-use desires.

The controls would overallocate land to agricultural

production based on the belief that the interests of future generations
are not being looked out for and that

past and current supplies of

agricultural land have been and are inadequate.
As to the possibility of food shortages, the probability of that
occuring in the United States is essentially zero.

World food shortages

are not only a possibility but a distinct reality for many persons.
Very few areas of the world today are exempt from periodic food
shortages.

Unfortunately for some areas,

food shortages are a

continuing problem.
With a hypothesized growing world population, the export demand for
United States agricultural products is expected to increase in the
future .

The importance of these exports in alleviating possible world

food shortages is not significant.

To claim that these exports, "mean

the difference between 1 i fe and death to mi 11 ions of 1 ess fortunate
people whose 1 ives are marred by chronic hunger,"6 is incorrect .
According to Raup (1982 ):
. . . it is clear that the vast bulk of U.S. grain exports goes
to feed livestock in countries that are not, by world food
standards, among the impoverished. In short, young American
families are being asked to forgo their homes in the suburbs
so that American farmers can feed Russian cows. 7

-----6~jl-l-l~~-A. Fishcel, "The Urbanization of Agricultural Land : A
Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study," Land Economics 58 (May
1982): 258.
7 Ibid., p. 258.
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In order for U.S . exports to help alleviate possible world food
sh or tages, what is required is a shifting of current e xport pattern s.
Although there is no general consensus as to the appropriate discount rate today, there is general concern that the low rates attributed
by public holders may not reflect the current economic environment and
may distort land-use decisions.
discount rate,

To more accurately represent the

it is argued that the current opportunity cost of

captialbe considered. With empirical research demonstrating that actual
public holder discount rates are far below the calculated opportunity
cost of capital ,investigation should be directed toward finding the true
economic costs incurred by

low public holder discount rates.8

To argue for the existence of collective goods associated with
agricultural

land uses, requires evidence.

With evidence lacking, the

collective good argument does not appear to be relevant since food and
fiber product industries do not di sp 1 ay co 11 ecti ve good characteristi cs.
Neither is any evidence presented suggesting that monopolistic and
monopsonistic e 1 ements dominate the agri cu ltura 1 product and factor
markets .

These markets are characterized by a high degree of

c ompetition, perhaps more so than for any other sector in the economy.
Finally,

the merit good argument is not convincing since value

judgements are to be made when considering a good for merit good status.
With arguments presented for and against agricultural 1 and-use controls,
a conclusion may be reached as to the theoretically more efficient landuse allocation method.

-----8$~~-E~l~- T. Marnell, "Water Project Evaluation: A Review of the
Narrows Project, Colorado," University of Col ora do, December 1980.
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Conclusions
Agricultural lands are a valuable natural resource, but are not the
only valuable resource in the economic system.

In a system that prizes

economic freedom, to claim that agricultural 1 ands must be preserved
requires proof that society would be better off by that decision.
Through the presentation of arguments for and against agricultural 1 anduse controls, it was argued that a competitive market best determines
the optimal allocation of 1 and.

Unless there is strong contrary

evidence, land-use changes should be viewed as a demonstration that the
economic system is working.

That is, resources are being reallocated to

the uses that are valued more highly by society.

Justified or not,

agricultural land-use controls exist and are being used.

Given their

existence, the objective of the remainder of the thesis will be to
empirically investigate the effectiveness of agricultural land-use
controls.
Thesis Objectives
The objectives of the thesis are to :
1.

Measure the extent of state land-use controls; and

2.

Test the effectiveness of state and county agricultural
1and-use contro 1 s.

The thesis is organized as follows.
agricultural 1 and-use control 1 aws.

Chapter II describes the variety of
The controls are classified into

two categories for the purpose of the thesis:
indirect controls.
reviewed.

direct controls and

In Chapter Ill 1 iterature on the subject is

A mathematical model is developed in Chapter IV.

The purpose

14

is to illustrate possible consumer and producer economic reactions to
changes in certain variables that may ultimately affect land-use
demands.

Chapter V presents empirical models to estimate agricultural

land-use direct control effectiveness.
analyzed in Chapter VI.

The empirical results are

The important conclusion and policy

implications are summarized in Chapter VII.
A summary of direct and indirect land-use control measures for each
state responding to the survey constitutes the appendix.

15

CHAPTER II
LAND-USE CONTROLS
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, land-use planning received
increasing attention from those individuals concerned with national
land-use trends.

The trends depicted a shifting pattern among the land

uses away from agricultural to other uses.

Operating with the belief

that reductions in agricultural land-use were not socially desireable,
1 and-use p 1 anni ng and agri cul tura 1 1 and-use contro 1 s were 1 ooked upon to
reverse this trend.

Collective action on the part of these concerned

i ndi vi dua 1 s was necessary to bring about 1 and-use p 1 anni ng si nee there
numbers were small.

A starting point was the political arena .

the purpose of the collective action was

to apply

po 1 i ti ci ans to enact 1 and-use p 1 anni ng 1 egis 1 ati on.

There,

pressure

on

To support their

arguments, statistics relating to agri cu 1 tura 1 1 and conversion rates
were cited.

With the general electorate subjected to large publicity

campaigns, numerous county and state agencies came under increasing
pressure to adopt agricultural

1 and-use controls, in one form or

another, to preserve agricultural 1 and.

The purpose of this chapter

will be to outline these controls on agricultural land use.

Direct

controls, or controls that have a direct influence on agricultural land
use,

are outlined first since the thesis is measuring their

effectiveness.

An out 1 i ne of indirect contro 1 s then fo 11 ows.
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Direct Controls
Agricultural Districting
This designates specific tracts of land for long-term agricultural
uses and is usually coupled with benefits and assurances to improve the
conditions for farming.
imposed on land use.

In most cases, no legally binding controls are

Contracts are usually signed by those individuals

desiring that a district be formed with the contract being for some
specified period of time.

However,

if an individaul no longer wishes

to be in the district he or she may get out of the contract commitment
since district participation is voluntary.

The ease with which an

individual may get out of the contract colll11itment will depend upon at

1 east two factors; the proposed 1 and use change and the 1 ocati on of the
land within the district.
Agricultural Zoning
A legally binding designation of land uses, including amount, type,
and 1 ocation of any development, is imposed with zoning.

Agricultural

zoning restricts land uses exclusively to agricultural and/or related
uses .

Often a 1 arge minimum 1 ot size (10-160 acres) is called for in

the zone to discourage subdivision, thereby, continuing its agricultural
homogeneity.
of land.

Zoning changes are not impossible for an individual parcel

The degree of success would depend on, among other things, the

landowners economic, political, and religious power or influence in the
COITI11Uni

ty.

Purchase and Resale or Lease with Restrictions

---------

This involves the purchase of 1 and by government agencies, the
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imposition of restrictions on its use and development, and resale back
to any i ntere s ted parties at the market price.

The end result is

equivalent to the purc hase of development rights.
Purchase of Development Rights
A designated agency purchases the development rights from
1 andowne r s of specific parcels, 1 eaving the 1 andowner all other rights
of ownership.

The price of the rights is the dimunition in the market

value of the 1 and as a result of 1 ass of the development rights.

The

remaining value of the land is the farm use value.
Indirect Controls
Comprehensive Planning
A process, usually political in nature, 1 eading to adoption of a
set of interrelated policies regarding 1 and use,

transportation,

housing, public facilities, and economic and social issues.

It may or

may not include a land-use plan designating particular land uses.

In

most states, the plan i n itself is not legally binding on governments or
individuals.
follow.

Instead, it serves as a set of suggested guidelines to

A few states do require that zoning and major public facility

plans be consistent with their comprehensive plans.
Development Permit System
Requires that a special permit be acquired for development from the
appropr iate state or regional agency.
addition to normal

The development permits are in

local zoning and building permits.

The flow of

development permits may be restricted if additional development is
deemed und esi reabl e.

A si mi 1 a r approa ch waul d be to place an uppe r
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1 imit on the total number of construction permits to be issued during a
given time period.

The most drastic step would be to place a total

moratorium on all building.
Differential Property Tax Assessment
Different assessments are applied to agricultural lands in an
attempt to keep them in agricultural use.

Assessments are based on the

farm use value of the land rather than on its current market value which
reflects its development potential.
differential assessment are:

The three major types of

(1) pure preferential assessment, (2)

deferred taxation, and (3) restrictive agreements.
Pure preferential assessment is a reassessment of eligible land on
the basis of its current farm use value rather than its market value.
Deferred taxation is similar to pure preferential assessment, except
that if land is converted to a noneligible use, a penalty is imposed on
the landowner consisting of the taxes he or she were excused from paying
for some specified number of years plus an interest penalty.

The

pena 1 ty sum can be quite 1 arge.
Restrictive agreements require participants to sign a contract with
a designated public agency stipulating that the 1 and wi 11 be devoted to
an e 1 i gi b 1e use during the contract 1 ength (typi ca 11 y ten years).

The

participant then receives a current use value assessment on his or her
land.

Penal ties similar to those of deferred taxation are imposed when

land use is changed to a noneligible use.
Nuisance Legislation (Right to Farm)
This is usually embodied in legislation seeking to limit private
anti-farm nuisance lawsuits stating that state and local legislation
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cannot be used to restrict "normal" day-to-day farming practices unless
they endanger public health or safety.
Transfer of Development Rights
Development rights in an area designated for preservation may be
purchased by a developer and transferred to a designated growth area.
To begin additional development in the growth area, development rights
must be purchased from landowners in the preservation area,

thus,

offering preservation area landowners at least partial compensation for
the monetary 1 oss they are incurring.
Conclusions
The controls outlined above are not a complete listing of available
controls.

They are general categories with many control variations

possbile in each.
presentation.

At a minimum, there are two purposes for their

First, they are presented so that the 1 iterature review

of Chapter III may be more easily followed.

More importantly, they are

presented so that a better foundation for a more complete understanding
of the controversy surrounding agricultural
remainder of the thesis may be developed.

1 and-use controls and the
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CIIAPITR II I
REVIEW OF LIITRATURE
The literature review revealed the lack of empirical work on the
effectiveness of agricultural land-use controls.
chapter is to:

The purpose of this

(1) review the 1 iterature on agricultural 1 and-use

contra 1 s, and (2) to identify areas where this 1 i terature is i ncomp 1ete.
To accomplish this, the chapter is divided into two parts .
first, nonempirical research in the field is summarized.

In the

In the second,

empirical research is summarized followed by comments on suggested
empirical work to provide insight into the effectiveness of agricultural
1and-use controls.
Nonempirical Research
Coughlin, Berry and Plaut9 analyze differential

property tax

assessment for agricultural land as a means for controlling land use.
They argue that differential assessment is an indirect land-use control
in that landowners are provided with an incentive to keep their land in
either open space uses or in agriculture, but they are not prohibited
from development.

As urbanization increases, property taxes rise

sharp ly capturing the land's speculative value.

With taxes rising and

income from agricultural land uses remaining relatively constant,

-----9R~b~~~-~~- Cough 1 in, David Berry, and Thomas P1 aut, "Differentia 1
Assessment of Rea 1 Property as an Incentive to Open Space ?reservati on
and Farmland Retention," National Tax Journal, (June 1978), pp. 165- 179.
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agricultural 1 andowners face an increasing tax burden.

They argue that

by itself, differential assessment does not appear to be an effective
tool for keeping land in agricultural use.

Participants in differential

assessment programs tend to be 1 ocated outside areas of strong urban
pressure (the rura 1-urban fringe),

suggesting that,

farmland owners in

these areas have been reluctant to 1 imit their development options.
Farmers further away from the development fringe area are more likely to
engage in a differential assessment program since they have less to
gain.

Differential assessment must complement other measures for it to

be useful in keeping land in agriculture.

Rollback penalties should be

provided that incorporate an interest rate charge so that 1 andowners
have not received, in effect, a tax free loan on the difference between
their land's speculative and current use values.
MasonlO analyzes the transfer of development rights (TDR) as a
land-use control.
zoning.

He argues that a TDR program is an extension of

An area is considered for a TDR program when it is experiencing

development pressure.

If such pressure exists, the area is split into a

growth area and a preservation area.

To further develop, 1 andowners in

the growth area must secure development rights from 1an downers in the
preservation area.

A potentia 1 prob 1 em with a TDR program is that the

compensation received by owners in the preservation area is likely to be
less from what they would receive in a competitive market outcome,
because growth area 1 andowners have an incentive to underestimate or
underbid the value of preservation area development rights.

Preserva-

-----16(;~~~-M~~on, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets: A Note on
A1 ternati ves to Zoning," The Anna 1 s of Region a 1 Science, (Ju 1y 1979 ),
pp. 54-65.
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ti on area 1 an downers wou 1 d incur a 1 ass of potentia 1 income.

By recog-

nizing the potential problems in setting up a market for preservation
area development rights, Mason concludes that TOR programs have a
definite advantage over zoning--in that limited development is permitted
with at 1 east parti a 1 compensation for those affected.

Whether or not

to implement such a program depends on the costs involved.
Barrows and Prenguber11 submit that traditional zoning is
inadequate because the "windfall-wipeout" dilemma is created.

The

windfall-wipeout dilemma occurs when an area or parcel of land is zoned
for an activity that would yield a lower development value for its
landowner.

For example, this would occur if land that is not zoned and

had a market value of $15,000 per acre and then was zoned for
agricultural use only.

The land then may be worth only $1,500 per acre.

The 1 andowner suffers a "wipeout" 1 ass of $13,500 per acre since the
1 ass is uncompensated.

For this reason, the authors argue that a TOR

program is superior to traditional

zonin~

Barrow's and Prenguber's study the problems that may be caused by
development around an interstate highway exchange had a TOR program been
in effect.

Like Mason12 they submit that attempts to create a private

development rights market are full of uncertainties.

In order for this

market to be created, a very sophisticated and highly trained planning
agency would be called for. They conclude that TOR is a promising
concept needing further empi rica 1 research.

-----llR-i-~h~~d- L. Barrows and Bruce A. Prenguber, "Transfer of
Development Rights : An Analysis of a New Land-Use Policy," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (Nov. 1975 ), pp. 549-557.
12Mason, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets :
Alternatives to Zoning," pp. 54-65.

A Note on
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Brubaker13 reviews the issue of increasing conflicts over land use
and analyzes the possiblity of the conversion of noncropland to cropland
uses.

According to the author,

the essential

accommodate changing demands on the land.

problem is how to

Land use patterns are influ-

enced by the physical capability of the land, economic demand for particular land uses, and preferences revealed through public policies.

With

physical capabilities ranking less as a determinant of overall land use,
potential competition for land among uses is significant and must be
resolved by economics or by pol icy.

This suggests a hierarchy of econo-

mic demands on the

reflects

relationships.

land which

long-standing

price

The demand for cropland is one of these demands.

To

determine if cropland needs extra market protection is a question
depending upon future projections of not domestic demand for agricultural products but on the future foreign demand scenarios and on
physical yields.
Furuseth14 reviews and assesses Oregon's agricultural protection
program, presenting a much broader analysis of agricultural land-use
controls than Coughlin,

et. al ,15 Mason16 and Barrows, et. al.17

-----13$~~;]j~; Brubaker, "Land--The Far Horizon," American Journa 1 of
Agricultural Economics (Dec. 1977), pp. 1037-1044.
14owen J. Furuseth, "The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A
Review and Assessment," Natural Resources Journal 58 (1982) : 236-259.
15 coughl in, "Differential Assessment of Real Property as an Incentive to Open Sapce Preservation and Farmland Retention," p~ 165-179.
16 Mason, "The Deregulation of Urban Land Markets:
Alternatives to Zoning," pp. 54-65.

A Note on

1 7Richard L. Barrows and Bruce A. Prenguber, "Transfer of
Development Rights:
An Analysis of a New Land-Use Pol icy," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics (Nov. 1975), pp. 549-557.
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Attent i on is focused on,

(1)

the components of the Oregon farmland

protection program, (2) the relative success or failure of the program,
and 0) the unique characteristics or attributes which Oregon is using
to keep land in agricultural use.
The Oregon 1 egis 1 ature ca 11 ed on the Land Conservation and
Development Commission (LCDC) to prepare and enforce a statewide landuse planning pol icy.
became effective.
agriculture.

On 1 January 1975, the Statewide Planning Goals
Two of the planning goals directly related to

One addresses the farmland conversion issue.

Embodied in

this goal is an explicit state policy to protect prime and valuable
agricultural 1 and from conversion .

It is required that all prime or

valuable agricultural land be inventoried and placed in effective farm
use (EFU) zones with large lot requirements enacted to discourage
subdi vision.
The other called for all municipalities to establish urban growth
boundaries (UGB) to identify and separate urban 1 and from rura 1 areas.
Furuseth believes this goal strengthens and complements state policy
aimed at protecting agricultural 1 ands.

He concludes that determining

if Oregon's public policy action has succeeded in reducing the quantity
of prime agricultural land converted into urbanization is not possible
with empirical proof lacking.

Lacking empirical evidence, a second test

suggested to gauge the success of the public policy action is to look at
the degree of public acceptance and support for the program.

With

sixty-one percent of Oregonians in favor of the voting public policy
action in the 1978 election, he views Oregon's program as an unqualified
success.
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Empirical Research
As noted in the introduction to the chapter, empirical research
directed at measuring the effectiveness of agricultural

land-use

controls is lacking.

A search of recent literature in the field found

one empirical work.

Furuseth18 updates his earlier work with the

inclusion of data from The 1978 Census of Agriculture.

While an

empirical model is not specified by the author, one may infer that
changes in the quantity of farmland are related to the existence of
agri cu 1 tu ra 1 1 and-use contro 1 s.

His contention is that there will be a

direct relationship between the existence of the controls and changes in
the quantity of agricultural

land.

That is, the existence of the

controls will result in an increase in the quantity of agricultural
land .
With direct agricultural land-use controls effectively implemented
in Oregon in 1974, comparisons are made between changes in the quantity
of agricultural land before and after 1974.

Noting that for the period

1974-1978 there was an increase in 1 and in farms of 177,809 acres, he
finds that to be an encouraging indicator that Oregon's agricultural
land use appears to be undergoing healthy expansion.

Furthermore,

agricultural land-use controls may take at least partial credit for that
phenomenon.
Conclusions
In general, empirical research into the effectiveness of

-----Is(j:~~-J~-Furuseth, "The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program:
Review and Assessment,"
614.

A
Natura 1 Resources Journa 1 (J u 1y 1980 ), pp. 603-
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agricultural land-use controls is limited to one work in the literature.
Furuseth's article is a start in the right direction.

It is inadequate

since it fai 1 s to consider other elements that may affect changes in
agricultural land use.

There is a need for an empirical model to

measure the effectiveness of agri cu ltura 1 1and use contra 1 s by a 11 owing
for other elements affecting agricultural land use.

Such a model is

justified to demonstrate the failures or successes of the controls and
to discuss the corresponding costs or benefits they impose on society.
Chapter IV establishes a theoretical foundation from which an empirical
model is developed in Chapter V.
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CHAPT£R IV
THEORETICAL MODEL
The groundwork

for understanding the dynamic forces for

agricultural land-use change has been outlined.

It will be helpful to

construct basic decision models to bring the issues into focus.

The

decision models are necessary to illustrate the economic reactions of
consumers and producers (farmers) to changes in chosen variables that
may, either directly or indirectly, affect the demand for land in
agricultural or other uses.

The models are a necessary theoretical

foundation for the empirical analysis in Chapter V.

It is assumed that

consumers wil 1 seek to ma ximize their utility or satisfaction, and
producers will seek to maximize profits.

The models are 1 imited to two

sectors, agriculture and nonagriculture.
Consumer Model
The following notation is defined for the individual consumer:
(1)

income constraint

(2)

x1

commodity one

(3)

x2

=commodity two

(4) P1 =market determined price for
(5) P2 =market determined price for
(6)

x1
x2

U =the consumer's utility function .

The consumer is assumed to have a direct utility function that is

~8

"well-behaved. "

Uti 1 ity is a function of the consumption of commodities

(4 . 1)

The consumer will maximize utility subject to the budget constraint

p1 X1 + P2X2 = I.

(4.2)

Mathematically, the Lagrangian (L) expression formed is

with A an as yet undetermined multiplier.

The first order conditions

are

aL

ax1
aL

ax2
aL
d1T

= u1 (x 1 , x2 )

- AP1

=o

= U2 (X 1 , X2 ) - :\P2 = 0

=I

- P1X1 - P2X2

(4.4)

= 0.

The equilibrium conditions are

(4.5)

That is, the ratio of the marginal utilities for commodities
must equa 1 the commodity price ratio.

x1

and

x2

The first two equations of (4.4)

may be written as

Marginal utility per dollar spent must be the same for each commodity
and

x2•

x1

Aggregating this model wi 11 result in a national consumer

economic decision model.
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The Producer Model
The f ollowing notation is defined for the producer :
(1 J Pj = market determined (i.e., exogenous J prices for crops
j = 1, . . . , n.

(2) Yi =inputs to crop production for inputs
with

(3)

ri

1, 2, 3.

Y1 = capital input
y2

labor input

y3

1and input

input prices for Yi.

(4) qj =crop production function for j

1, . •

n.

such that qj = q(Y1, Y2, Y3J.
(5 J rr = profits

(6)

C =total cost of production.

The producer is interested in maximizing profits.

Profits are

defined as the difference between the total revenue (TR J received for
agricultura l output,
n

TR = j h { pj qj (Y 1' y2 y3 ) } '
and the total cost (C) incurred in producing that output,
3

C = i ~ 1 riYi.
Profit maximization is, therefore,
n

3

(MAX) rr = j ~ 1 { Pj qj(Y 1 , Y2 , Y3J l - i ~
The first-order conditions are

1

riYi.

(4.6)
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all

pf 2

r2

-all = pf3

- r3

-

=

av2
av3

0

(4 . 7)

= 0.

The equilibrium conditions are
pf1

r1

pf2

r2

pf3

=

(4.8)

r3.

In equilibrium, the value of the marginal product must equal the factor
input price for efficient production.

As before, summing these results

yields a national aggregation model.
Implications
These models can explain current economic trends in the land
market.

Figure 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) illustrate the conditions that existed

for the agriculture and nonagriculture sectors in the period 1909-1914.
To illustrate a point, it is assumed that the nonagricultural sector in
Figure 4.1(b) is represented by housing.
income, has grown steadily.

Since that period, per capita

An economy with increasing per capita

incomes requires agriculture to undergo continuous change and
adjustment.
food.

This is reflected in the income elasticity of demand for

For example, assume for the consumer, commodity

commodity

x2

is housing.

x1

is food and

Assume the consumer allocates a twenty percent

share (K 1 = 0.20) of income for food.

Thus, the share of income being

spent on X2 is eighty percent (K2 = 0.80 = 1 - K1l·

If the income

elasticity of demand for food (n1 l equals 0.16 (a realistic assumption
for industr i alized countri e s like the United States), the income
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elast icity of demand for hou sing (n2 ) mu st be 1.2119
With the income elasticity of demand for food greater than zero, an
increase in per capita income wil 1 result in an increase In the amount
of food de manded, assuming co nsta nt pri ces.

With n 2 > n 1 and with
increasing per capita real income over time the demand for food wi 11

increase less than proportionately to the increase in demand for
housing. 20 This changing situation over time is shown in Figure 4.2,
where the demand for housing has increased relative to that for food
since the outward shift in the housing demand curve over time from
DH1909-1914 to oH1983 in panel (b) is relatively larger than the outward
shift in the food demand curve from oF1909-1914 to oF1983 in panel (a).
This implies a declining relative demand for food.

Agriculture must

decline relatively because the demand growth for its output is slower
than for the output of the rest of the economy.21

Agriculture must

undergo continuous change and adjustment.
As real income rises, the relative shares will change (depending
upon the income elasticities of demand) such that the rate of change of
housing's expenditure share is positive while the rate of change of
food 's expenditure share is negative.
rise, n 1 may decrease.

Furthermore, as real incomes

This phenomenon has been observed and discussed

by D. Gale Johnson (1973).22
E<rhis must be so for the identity, K1n 1 + K2n 2 = 1, to hold.
20with the demand curves for housing and food derived from utility
maximizing behavior, four properties must be satisfied; 1) additivity,
2) negativity, 3) symmetry, and 4) homogeneity.
21 D. Gale Johnson, World Agricultural i n Disarray, (Bungay,
Suffolk, England: Richard ~The Chaucer PresS} Ltd., 1973), p. 89.
22tbid., pp. 91-92.

P Ag . Products (Food)

p Housing

SF

SH
p '

p '
F

"

r-------\-----1

------------------P

PF

"

1983

D

D 1983

F

H

D

1909-1914

II

n 1909-1914
~-

0

(a)

Q
Ag. Products (Food) 0

Figure 4. 2.

I

.,.,.

Q
Housing

(h)

National economic conditions

(1983)
w
w

34
With rising incomes, consumers may desire greater land area with a
home to ma xi mize their ut i lity .

Agric ultural

land resources are

s trained since the demand for land in hou s ing uses will increase
relative to the demand for land in agricultural uses.

Wi th a higher

relative price for housing as compared to food in Figure 4.2, (PH'/PF' >
PH/PF) land resources are shifted from agricultural use to housing to
capitalize on the relative price differential existing (PH'- PF').

The

consumer 's new optimal commodity combination requires a shift in land
usage to satisfy the higher relative demand for housing.
Population change is another primary var i able affecting the demand
growth for food.

However, In no case can the popu 1 ati on growth effect

outweigh the effect of an Income e 1 asti city of demand for food of 1 ess
than unity on the growth of food demand rei ati veto demand growth for
housing.

If relative prices are constant, the growth in demand for any

commodity or service can be depicted as follows:

D

=e

Y + P, where D,

Y, and Pare growth rates of quantity demanded, per capita income and
population, respectively, and e is the income elasticity of demand for a
particular commodity or group of commodities. 23

If the income

elasticity of demand of food is 0.16(e), Y is three percent and P is one
percent, D for food is 1.48 percent.

With Y equal to three percent, and

the income elasticity of demand of housing equal to 1.21, D will be 4.63
percent.

Even with a P of one percent, D for housing is relatively and

absolutely larger than D for food.
Expectations may be incorporated Into the ana 1ysi s.

If consumers

expect current housing market prices to be substantially lower than

-----23j~h~;~~~ World Agriculture ~Disarray, p. 94.
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future prices, consumers will react by shifting today's demand curve for
housing to the right relative to the future demand curve fo r housing.
Figure 4.2 may be changed to illustrate another point.

In Figure

4.3(a) and 4.3(b) are shown supply curve shifts for housing and food.
Agricultural output has been greatly expanded over time mainly due to
productivity gains and technological advances.

Assume that cost savings

in agriculture have exceeded cost savings in housing (in relative
terms).

This implies the supply curve for agriculture (food) shifts

further to the right than the supply curve for housing.
for food of pF1 9 8 3
PF 1983

A lower price

will result. The price differential

(pH1 983 -

is greater than the price differential (pH1983 - pF1983) before

the supply curve shifts.

Observing this situation, producers waul d

convert land to capitalize on the greater price differential existing to
maximize proffts.

With the supply of land fixed at any one point in

time and a rising demand curve for land devoted to housing use, a higher
price must result.

These higher 1 and input prices will be incorporated

by the producer since, depending upon the particular location involved,
assessed property taxes rise to reflect the higher 1 and market va 1 ues
(assuming that no differential assessment program is in existence for
agricultural land).
Labor inputs in agricultural

production have been declining over

time due to their relatively higher cost.

Observation of condition (4.

8) re vea 1 s that, with the price of output constant (p) and with r 3
rising, the producer must reallocate resources so as to raise the
marginal product of land

ff 3 ~

To accomplish this, land inputs should

trend downward. With declining relative land inputs, and declining labor
inputs, cap i tal inputs must increase to compensate for these effects .
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Through the decision models developed earlier and the manipulation
of demand and supply curves, the conclusion reached is that current
economic conditions are dictating a reallocation of land among the land
uses.

What remains is to structure an empirical model to isolate the

variables significantly responsible for land use changes.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The literature review of Chapter III revealed the inadequate amount
of attention devoted to the question of the effectiveness of state and
county agricultural 1 and-use controls.
national empirical investigation.

Lacking has been an overall

Chapter IV employed a simplified

decision model to describe possible consumer and producer economic
reactions to changes in chosen variables that may affect land-use
demand.

With this theoretical foundation developed, the purpose of this

chapter is to structure a model to test the effectiveness question.

To

accomplish this, two approaches will be undertaken.
In the first approach, comparisons of land-use trends are made for
states and counties grouped on a "with" and "without" 1and-use control
basis.

These comparisons will be indicative, but are lacking for they

fail to consider other forces that may be influencing land-use change.
In the second approach, multiple regression techniques are used to test
the effectiveness question while adjusting for other forces that may
affect land-use trends.
Re 1 evant state and county government agencies in the forty-eight
continental United States and sixty randomly selected counties were
surveyed to ascertain the initial dates of legislation (if any) passed
regulating or influencing agricultural land use.24

Thirty-nine state

24see Chapter II for an outline of the legislation.
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and twenty-seven county responses were received.
total

farmland,

total cropland,

Aggregate data on

and harvested cropland were analyzed

(irrigated harvested cropland was excluded since data was not
consistenly available at the county level).

For the first approach,

state periods examined are 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1969-1978.

County

periods examined are more extensive since the majority of early
1 egis 1 ati on adopted has been at the county 1 eve 1.

The county periods

examined are 1959-1964, 1964-1969, 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1959-1978.
Multiple Regression Model
The model to be estimated relates changes .!..!!_agricultural 1 and to
the fo 1 1 owing set of hypothesi zed exp 1 ana tory vari ab 1 es; (1) changes in
..

population, (2) changes in nonagricultural income, (3) changes in net
farm income (after inventory adjustment), (4) changes in government
payments, (5) a land-use control dummy variable, and (6) the ratio of
agricultural land to total land.

State and county data will be analyzed

for the periods 1969-1974, 1974-1978, and 1969-1978.

An explanation of

why each hypothesized explanatory variable was included, along with its
hypothesized sign, follows.
Population growth has been identified as one of the primary threats
to the maintenance of the nation's agricultural 1 and base.

Growth of

urban areas necessarily means expansion onto land adjacent to the urban
area (or land at the urban fringe).

This may occur at varying rates

depending upon the existing development density in the urban area and on
the desired development density in the areas to be expanded into.
Sometimes, this expansion of urban activity results in the conversion of
so called "prime" farmland, although, the actual extent of this has
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probably been overstated.

The coefficient on this variable should have

a negative sign, implying an inverse relationship between population
growth and changes in the quantity of agricultural land.
Higher nonagricultural incomes should result in an increase in the
demand for land in nonfarm uses.

With a low income elasticity of demand

for agricultural products as compared to the income elasticity of demand
for housing, the demand for 1 and for farm use is expected to be
negatively effected by changes in nonagricultural income because changes
in population growth and changes in nonagricultural income may be
highly correlated. Several variants of the regression model are
estimated to deal with the possible correlation.

Two equations include

both variables while the other two use only one at a time.

At the

county 1evel, one includes both variables whi 1e the other two use only
one at a time.
Changes in net farm income are included for as net farm income
rises the most likely result is an increase in the demand for land in
farm use.

This would be especially true if farmers believe that there

will be continual future increases in income. Therefore, changes in net
farm income should be positively related to changes in the demand for
land in agricultural use.
Changes in government payments to farmers should result in an
increase in aggregate demand for farmland.

There may be some validity

to excluding the variable since it already has been incorporated in net
farm income.

However, with respect to the extent that such payments

were made to keep land out of production, its inclusion is justified and
may have a negative effect on the level of harvested

croplan~
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A dummy variable for state and county control on agricultural use
is assigned the value of "1" for observations where such controls were
in effect and "0" otherwise.

The hypothesized sign is positive,

implying that if effective, the controls should have a positive effect
on changes in agricultural land.

In other words, land losses should be

smaller or land gains larger for states or counties with controls than
for those states or counties without controls.
The ratio of agricultural land to total land is included to capture
the potential for farmland expansion.

Other things equal, the lower the

ratio the easier it should be to expand the farmland base, and vice
versa.

A negative sign on the estimated coefficient is hypothesized.
Exclusion of Relevant Variables

With the hypothesized multiple regression model specified, the
problem of possible relevant variable exclusion exists.

If relevant

variables have been excluded, the results obtained are not as good as
they could be.

If too many variables are included, a higher coefficient

of determination may be gained at the expense of inferior additional
explanatory variables, weakening the model's overall justification.
What follows is a brief discussion of why three possible relevant
vari ab 1 es were exc 1 uded.
One possible relevant explanatory variable would be land
productivity.

As land productivity increases (in agricultural

output per unit of 1 and wil 1 increase.

terms),

This wil 1 be capita 1 i zed into

higher land values if left in agricultural production.

Increases in

productivity would lead to an increase in the demand for land in farm
use.

Howe ver, a data weakness for productivity is that it is measured
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i n inde x form nationally and not at the s tate or county level .

With

respect to the model, any land productivity measure would be a constant
serving no real purpose.

To be truly use ful , productivity figures must

be available in a state index figure and a county index figure.
The ratio of the change in agricultural product prices to changes
in a general price index, such as the GNP deflator, would be relevant if
di vidsibl e at the state and county 1 evel . With agricul utral prices
increasing relative to changes in the GNP deflator, an increase in the
demand for land in farm use would be expected.

Farmers would be gaining

in real terms (assuming they can sell all their output at the prevailing
pricesL

Since the price ratio is essentially the same nationally,

it

would be a constant.
The last possible relevant explanatory variable is interest rates.
Lower interest rates for farm er s would result in an increase in the
demand for land in farm use. With other things equal, if a farmer is
faced with the decision of expanding his acreage base, 1 ower interest
rates will reduce his payments.

However, since interest rates vary only

slightly, it would be a constant i f included in the regression.
One ca n no doubt think of other possible variables that may be
included .

However, inadequate justifications and data collection

problems eliminate them from consideration.

With the model specified,

regression results are prese nted and analyzed in Chapter VI .
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS

Chapter IV established, using decision models for the consumer and
producer and demand-supply curve analysis, a theoretical foundation from
which to structure an empirical model.
empi rica 1 mode 1 in two approaches.

Chapter V presented the

In the first, agri cultura 1 1 and-use

control effectiveness was tested by measuring land-use trends for states
and counties grouped on a "with" and "without" 1 and-use control basis.
The hypothesis tested is that the mean percent change in the quantity of
agricultural 1 and for the "with" control group is greater than the mean
percent change for the "without" group, i.e., that agricultural 1 and-use
controls are effective.
agricultural

In the second, changes in the quantity of

land were hypothesized to be a function of several

explanatory variables stuctured in a multiple regression model.
3, 4, and 5 summarize the results from the first approach.

Tables

Tables 5

through 12 summarize the results from the multiple regression model .
First Approach
State Results
In Table 3, there are nine relevant state comparisons made for the
three time periods and for the three land categories .25 The aggregate

----25(:]-e-;;;~, total cropland is probably the most important of the
three categories.

TABlE 3
<n!PARISOO OF A<nm::ATE AND AVEliAGE ~ IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND STATE WI'll!
AND WITOOur LAIID-lliE a:wma..s; 1969-74, 1974-78, AND 1969-78 (ACREAGE in 1000'S)
1969-1974a

1974-:_19J011"

- - - - rro-

1969-1976c

rro-

rro-

cantrors

Controls

Controls

Controls

Controls

Controls

I.H,7.B
l.l2,0l7
-5,G96
-4.14

771,695
741,H5
-JO ,.l60
-.l .9.l

167,939
168,474
5l5
O.l2

705,4.}.}
714, .) 75
8,942
1, 27

1.H ,7.ll
lll,004
4,729
.l.4.l

771,695
749,845
-21,850
-2.8l

5.79

.). 16

5.56

}.47

Total far•land
Acroago--lnltlol yoar
Acreago-tormlnal yoar
Chango
Porcentage change

-----...---------------------------------------------------------------------------------5.91
-6.96
2.07
3.67
-l.59
-}.88

Aver ago percentage chonga
Standard deviation
•t• statistic

4.40
0.55

-1.07

5.00
0.18

Total Croplondb
Acreogo--lnlthll year
Acreago-tor•lnal year
Change
Percentage change

64,501
61,261
-},240
-5.02

}29,67}
}17,050
-12,82}
-J.89

71,774
75,047
},27}
4.56

.}.48

6.59

}()6,5:n
}19, 751
1} , 214
4.31

64,501
64,}44
-157
-0.24

5.84

7.46

J29,87.l
.}30,454
581
6.18

---·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4.59
-5.04
7.99
7.66
J.92
1.96

Average percentage change
Standard deviation
•t• statistic
llarvos tod Crop land
Acreoge--lnltlol year
Acreage-terminal year
Change
Percontago change

1.97
0.9J
.}6,460
42,251
},791
9.86

198,756
21},952
15,194
7.64

48,208
49,320
1,112
2.ll

7.43

7.88

o. 13

4. 74
0.66

207,995
226,045
18,050
8.68

.}8,460
43,440
4,980
12.95

198,758
231,925
33,167
16.69

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------7,12
7, 70
7,04
8. 70

Average percontoge change
Standard deviation
•t• statistic

4.24

-o,}}

7.12
-o,54

15,69
4. 7l

16,75
6. 72

-o.49

land. aln 1969, of tho thirty-nine states surveyed, there wore seven states vlth contro ls on tho use of agricultural
bin 1974, of the thirty-nine stetu surveyed, there were eight with controls on tho uso of agricultural land.
<:eased on the uven stetes with controls In 1969.

......

TABLE 4

a:NPARISOO OF A(X;RffiATE AND AVERAGE CHANGrn IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND <XXJNI'Y Wl'lli
AND W!THQ(1J' LAND--USE mtmlOLS ; 1969--74, 1974-78, AND 1969--78 (AffiEAGE IN 1000'S)
1969-.19H a

Total far•lend
Acreago-lnltlal yuM
Acreago-tunnlnal yoer
Change
Percenhgtt change
Averago porcentage change
Stondar d deviation
"t" statistic
Total Croplandb
Acreage--In It tal year
Acreage-tenalnal year
Change
Percentege change
Average percentage change
Standard deviation
•t• statistic

5.164
4 , 695
-269
-5.21

7 ,42}
7,109
-}14
-4.2}

6,106
6,500

-6.04
7,}1

2. 77
8.41

o. 57

},174
},056
-116
-}.65

Contro l s

}92
4 . 8}47

Cont•·o l s

Cont ro ls

Controls

},696
},666
-}0
-o.17

5, 164
5, 1}9
-25
-{).46

7 ,42}
7,227
-196
-2.64

-1.27
6,55

-2.}6
11.64

0,52

4,69}
4,512

-4.86
6.69

- ,;a--

~ro--

Cont ro l s

-•. 55
5.91

1969 -1978c

1974-1 9 78°

- - -- ,:oContr o ls

-181
-},66

5,111
5,495
}64
7,51

2,459
2, 510
51
2,07

-5.74
6,25

5. 52
7. 76

2,50
5,56

0.}27}

-5.61
11 . 14
0 , 74

4,69}
4. 749
56
1.19

}, 174
},256
62
2.56

-2 . }6
9,67

-o.04}
9,24

0,601

'· 16

t&orves tod Crop I and

Acreage-Initial year
Acreage-tert~~lnal year
Change
Percentage change

},25}
}, 752
499
15,}4

I, 794
2,00
}}6
16 . H

1,91}
1,975
62
},24

},969
4, 209
240
6 , 05

},25}
},926
67}
20,69

1,794
2, 256
464
25,66

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17,}1
6,27
24.4
18.69
}. 54

Average percentage change
Standard dovlotlon
"t" statistic

12.14

10.6

16.5

1.2486

9.06

9. 5
-0.76

22.01

8.85
1,16

0
1n 1969, of th e twdnty-seven cou nties surveyed, there w• re nine counties with controls on tho use of
•grlcultunl land.

bin 1974, of tho twttnty-soven co unties surveyed, there were fourte o n counties with controls on the usa of
tun I land.

~rlcul

'nasad on the nine counties with controls In 1969.

-"'
<.n

TABLE 5

<XIIPARISJN OF AGGRffiATE AND AVERAGE CHANGES IN FARMLAND BY TYPE AND <X>Um'Y Willi
AND WITIIOlff lAND-USE CXNI'IlOL.'i; 1959--M, 1~, AND 1959--78. (ACREAGE IN 1000'S )
1

I IJ:i'J -1 1)(. 4'
_ _ _.:..:.;..:_..:.;_-no-

Cont ro ls

Contr o ls

1964 - I 96 1} 1
---=..:....=~~ro--

1959-1978c< ro_ ___:..:.;.::....:..:..:c:

Controls

Con trols

Con trols

Con tr o ls
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total for•lond
Aerugo-InItIo I yoar
Acroago-to>rmlnal yollr
Chango
Porcontage chllnt:Jt.l

},605
'· 754
1<9
4.1.)

9,414
9,}15
- 99
-1.05

4,498
4, 526
28
0.62

10 , 87

6,98

e. 571
8 , 061
-510
-5 , 95

} , 605
l, 950
}45
9, 57

9 , 414
8 , 416
-998
-10 , 60

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·-----I, 19
-4.14
-{),57
-9.28
5,67

.t.verage percentage chana•
Standard deviation
"t• statistic

7, 5l

Total Croplandb
Acroago-1 n If I a I yoar
Acreage-terminal yoor
Change
Percentage chango

2,28}
2,270

1.45} 1

5 , 501
5,4}7
-64
-1.16

-I}

..{).51

10 . 57
2.46 11

2,50}
2,684
181
7.2}

-16,95
21 , }0

15,}9

2.74) ...

5, 204
5 , 18}
-21
-o.40

2, 28}
2, 575
292
12,79

5, 50 1
5,438
-71
-1.29

--------------·--------------------·---------------------------------------------------0.18
-4.04
5,61
-I. 15

.t.verage percentage change
Standard deviation
•t• statistic
llbrvostod Croplllnd
Acreage--Initial year
Acreage-•ter•lna I year
Change
Percentage change

6.}4

1.101
1,416
1,}28
-88
-6.21

9.52

12.86

12. 51
I, 20

4,219
},902
-}11
-1.51

2.99

10.40

13.26

1,4H
1,511

14.45
8.48

.).97 ...

},757
}, 5}0
-227
-6 . 04

1,416
I , 748

-1.86
19.45

4,219
4,4}6

217
"
2},45
5. 14
---------------------------------------------·-------------------------------------------------Average percentage change
-4.04
-12.83
-0.54
-10.95
27.27
-8.2 8

Standard deviation
wr• statistic

11.06

1.107

11 . }1

1. 854 ..

}}2

}2 . 19

21,54
2.J5} ..

8
1n 1959, of the twenty-seven counties surveyed, there were five counties with contro ls on the use of
agricultural land.
bin 1964, of the twonty-sevon counties surveyed, thore were seven counties with controls on the use of
agricultural land.
caaud on the five counties with controls In 1959.
NOTEz

Superscripts •, "• and

1
"

lndlcato 5lgnlflconce at the 0 . 10, 0.05, end 0.01 lovels, respectively.

_,.

"'

TABLE 6
Sl.MoiARY OF ESTIIIATED STATE RFDIDlSION ~ATIONS
Dependent Verleble:

Eq.

Per lod

6Total Fetrmlend

Constant

(;
Population

-----

(I)

1969-1974

-6a5.1
(-1.48)

(2)

1969-1974

-555,6
(-1. 57)

-I. 522 1 . .
(-3.24)

(3)

1969-1974

-449.4
1-1. 18)

-1.357 ..
1-2.63)

6

Independent Ver lllbl es
!1 NeT

Farm

Land

6 Government

Control
Ounmy

L11nd

Nonegr I cuI ture I
Income

Income

Peyments

-a.a6a•
(-1.86)

a.a77
( 1.32)

1. 522 111
(5.35)

299.2
<a.65)

1746. 5•
(1.97)

a.63

11.3'''

----

a.1a1
( 1,89)

1.439 111
(5,61)

275.a
1a.69l

1459,9•
(1,81)

a.69

14.7 ...

a.111
(2.a1)

1.384* ..
15.18)

384.9
1a.91)

131a.5
(1.57)

a. 1a

12. 3'''

-a.a25
1-a. 79)

Retlo

R2

7;;---i9;;:i9;ii---;;;~;~------:::·----------o~o;;;;-------o:-;~9;;----o~3oii-------:;;;~;;-----:;;;:-;-----o:s;;--·-s:s••

<a.26)

---

15)

1974-1978

155.8
10. 58)

a.472
(1,41)

(6)

1974-1978

68.79
1a.27)

-a.a98
1-a.22)

12.44)

a.a27•
(1,93)

12.21)

(1.51)

1-1.77)

0.119 ..
(2.a6)

a. 266
(1,22)

-331.4
1-1.21)

-216.8
(-Q.32)

(-Q.53l

a.121 ..
(2.18)

a.317
11.50)

-479.6•
1-1.75)

-353.a
1-Q.54)

a. 26

2. 3 '

a.34

2.7 ..

u;-~969:~9;-a---~;;;:;·------:::-----------:o:ooii--------:o:o;------o:ii;;:;-------;9:;;-----=~~;o:8;----o:~3----~: 6• ''

10.36)

---

(8)

1969-1978

244.9
(a.B4)

-0.967 111
1-3. 19)

(9)

1969-1978

261.1
(a.83)

1-3.a9>

NJTE:

-0.961 111

1-a.52)

---a.aa2
1-a.16)

(-a.28)

12.a6>

1a.a6)

1-1.96)

a.a91
1 1.49)

a. 57a•
1 1.86)

99.18
1a.26)

-1401.8**
1-2.71)

o.a95
( 1,43)

0.536
( 1,44)

129.3
1a.31)

-1406.1 ..

"t" stetlstlcs are shown In parentheses below the estlmeted coefficients.

a. so

6.6 ...

a. 50

5.4 •••

1-2.68)

Superscripts •, ••, end ••• Indi ca te

slgnlflclllnce et the 0.10, 0.05, end 0.01 levels, respectively.

.....
""'

TABLE 7
SlldloiARY OF ESTIMATED STATE RmlESSION
Dependent V&rleble :

l1

~ATIONS

Total Cropland

Independent Yar-lables

Eq,

(1

Period

Conshnt

(11

196~1974

-128,6
(-1, 251

121

1969-1974

-14 2 .}
(-1,}51
- D8,8
1-1 , 271

D1

1969-1974

.

Population

--

f!.Honagrlculturel
I nco~n&

6Fe~~ern-~nt
Income

Payrnents

Co~~~~~

R&tlo

I 5)

1974-1978

104.0
(0. 741

16)

1974-1978

66.1
(0,521

R2

-0,000}
t-0,0}1

0,01}
(0,581

o. 729 111
(8,221

-162,0
t-0.961

888. Jll
(2,47 1

o. 73

17.9 ...

0,211
(0,261

---

0,009
10.421

o. 741 111

-174,}
1-1,091

949.2 11
(2,281

o. 73

18 . 0 ...

(7. 741

0,07}
10,}01

-o.002
1-0.161

0.010
10,441

o. 740 ...
17.61 1

-165.4
t-0,971

953.4 ..
(2,251

o. 7}

14.5 11 '

--

7~;- --~~;;:-;~;;---·-;;:~ -------==-----------~:;;;;:::------;;:~;;:::-----;;:~;Q:::---:;;;~:;::----

10,671

land

Ounmy

--

15,}71

0.995 ...
(},961
0.250
10,751

0.032 11
(},051

(},681

(},711

0.121 ...
12.921
0.127...
(},411

_75;:;:-----o:66--T2:6

1-2.241

1-1,651

0.240 1
I I, 79)

-209,8
1-1.081

108,9
10.201

0.377...
12,951

-39.).5 11
(-2,141

-570.6
1-1,071

1"

0,56

e. s•••

0,66

to.s•••

;-;~---~969:~9;s----6;:6--------:::-----------ii:iiii;---------ii:ii~9;-----ii:~;~------:;68:;-------:;~;:~;-----o:~----,:~

.1 0.521
181
191

NOTE:

1969-1978
1969-1978

--

12},1
(0,981

-o,ll5
1-0,651

98,}
10.741

-0,1}1
t-o. 121

10,5}1

--0.004
(0,621

(1,741

1-0 , 741

1-1,271

1-2,201

0.07-4 11
(2,081

-o. 2J5
1-1,501

-206,8
(-1,101

-880.6 ..

0,067•
t I, 781

-0,170
(-0,891

-165,9
1-1,251

-889.9 11
{-2.251

"t" stet I stl cs are shown In perentheses be I ow the est I mated coef f lc Ients.
significance et the 0.10, 0.05, end 0.01 levels, respectively.

Superscripts •,

..-

0,}1

2. 92 11

0,}2

2.5 11

1-2.251

..

, end ••• Indicate

_,
OJ

TABLE 8
SLUMRY OF ESTUIATED STATE RffiRESSION EXlUATIONS
Dependent V lSr Ia b I e:

lJ.

Harvested Crop 1and

Independent Var I abIes
Eq.

Period

Constant

6

Population

~Nonag ricultural
Income

I,,

196!1-1974

~~g:b

:::

~~:g~~...

(2)

1969-1974

~~6:~71

~=~:~!;·

:::

OJ

1969-1974

-~g:~4)

~=~::~~

~=~:g?;::

6

e

-~ana

6

Farm
Income

Government
Payments

Control
Ounmy

Land
Ratio

R2

~~:~w·· ~:g:m

2~u 3 ,

50~;:~;;·

o. 78

23. 7· ..

~~:~::· .. l:g:~~:

;~:~,,

42~~:~~;·

0,77

21,9 ' "

2~~:;9) 45~;:~;;·

0.80

20. 8 ' "

~~:~:~· .. l:g:~~~

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------... --------------------------------14)
1974-1978
26,8
0.027
-0.081
0,026
-421. 2**
402.8
10 , 25)
6 . 8 ...
14,)))
o. 51
-12.50)
10,28)
1-2. 58)
10,88)
111

15)

16)

1974-1978

1974-1978

68,4

0,641<

10 . 58)

12.89)

26.2
10.24)

0,014
10,05)

---

0.027***
12,82)

1 ...

0,075'
12,02)

-0 ,0 75

-260,0

)077,9'

0,)8

4 .\

0,51

5.5'"

111

1-0. 70)

1-1, 50)

0,024
10. 2JJ

-420.3 ..
1-2 . 52)

14,1JI

1-0,471

1-1.021

0.213***
15,13)

-o. 176
1-0,95)

-360,8
1-1,65)

4517.4 ...
16. 79)

0,84

35 . 3···

o. 223***
15, II J

-0,267
1-1. 2))

-2 76,2
1-I.IJ J

4557.6***
16. 78)

0.84

29 . 1 •••

0.080**
12,40)

12,0))
414.8

10, 77)

;-;~---~~~~=~~;;---:~~:~---------:::-----------:~:~~~---------~:~~;:::---:~:~~~-----:;;~:;-----;;~;:~:::--~:§r---2§:3111
1-0,4))

--

181

1969-1978

49,)
10 .36)

- 0 . 595 ...
1-2,84)

19)

1969-1978

8 J ,4
10 . 55)

-o. 569**
1-2. 65)

NOTE :

11 11

1-I,J))

--

--

-o,006
1-0, 75)

t statisti cs are shown In pllrentheses below the estlml!ted coefficients.
signifi ca nce ~t the 0.10, 0.05, ~nd 0.01 levels, respectively.

18,951

Superscripts •, ••, and ••• lndicllte

-"·

"'

TAB!.£ 9
S!.MMARY OF ESTIMATED STATE IID:RESSIOO RESULTS
Excluded Vi!~rll!ble: lJ. Government Payments
Dependent Variables:
.6.Tot!!!l Farml&nd !Equations (1)-()JI;
Cropland !Equations (7)-(9)1

(',

Eq,
(I)

Per I od

1969-1974

6

Constllnt

Popu I at I on

NoMgrlcultural
Income

520,2
tl. 181

-1.882
<-2. 78) 111

(-1.66) ..

(21

1974-1978

-110.2
(-0,472)

0 , 0282
!0.064)

Dl

1969-1978

329.3
(1,05)

-1.076
(-3.53)* ..

-0.0699
0,0251

<1.72>*'
-0.0138
(-1.141

ilTohl Cropland !Equations (4)-(6)1 ; end 6Har v est e d
'

.6.

Net
Farm

L&nd

Control
Dunrny

land
Ro!Stlo

R2

0.0979
(1,341'

846,8
(I, 54 I'

-1906,2
(-2.56)*U

0,44

5. 24 •••

0,112
( 1.98)**

-446,7
(- 1.61 ,.

422, I
(1,07)

o. 29

2.70 ..

0,115
{I. 742) ..

385,8
( 1.0001

-1393, I
(-2.61 , ...

0,47

5.86 ···

-1183,9
<-2.27)* 1

o. 25

2. 15

Income

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. ------------------------(41
1969-1974
41,2
-0.620
-o,00834
0,0135
95,9
(0.23)

(-1. 71 , ••

(51

1974-1978

10,3
(0,0741

0.693
(2. II, ..

(61

1969-1978

69,7
(0, 54)

-0.0889
t-0,51)

(-0.39)

0,0213
( 1.95 , ••
0.00810
( 1.34 ,.

(0,351
0,111

(0,35)

<2. 71 , •••

-325,7
(-1.601'

0,0592
t 1,62 I'

-344,8
(-1. 79)* 1

613,5
(1.57)*

o. 57

e. 1a•••

-868,2
<-2.204 , ••

0,30

2 . 8 ..

(7.96)•••

o. 79

24. a •••

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1969-1974
-57 . 7
-o. 360
-0.0364
0.101
191.2
4933.6
(7)

t-0.42)

(8)

1974-1978

26,1
(0,25)

(9)

1969-1978

34,4
(0,24)

NOTE :

(-1.191

0,0433
(0. 16)

>···

-0,499
(-2.41

(-2.047) ..

D.23l***

(0,83)

0,0263
(2.961* ..

(2.43)* ..

-415,3
(-2. 54) •••

-0.000792
(-0, Ill

0,210
(4. 93>···

-397.9
(-1. 75) ..

0,0791

"t 11 stlltlstlcs ~reshown In p~rentheses below the estlm~ted coefficients.
lndlc.,te sign If lcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

498,8
(1.29

o. 51

)*

4627.7
(6.67 , •••

Superscr Ipts •,

••,

6 . 75 1 . .

0,84

~nd

34.

2···

•••
U1

0

TABLE 10
Su.tMARY OF ESI'IWATED REGRESSION ~ATIONS (CXXMrY DATA)
Dependent

Eq.

V~rl~ble:

Per lod

6 Tot~l farmland

r:,
Constant

Popu I at Ion

----

(I)

1969- l974

-38.443
(-1.8052)

(2)

1969-1974

-24 .3 19
(- 1.3272)

o. 10098
10.3739)

(3)

1969-1974

-37.808
(-1 .7055)

-0.0467
(-0 .15451

- 35 .007
(-0.9464)

0.4996
(0.5646)

- 63 .7204

0.08024
co. 1667)

Net

6Nonagr leu I tural
Income
0.0229
() .1522)

A F~rm
Income

L~nd

Control
Ourrrny

L~nd

R~tlo

R2

-0.626* ..
(-5.353)

-24.044**
(-) .8815)

47.72.3 ..
(). 760)

0.59

7.76 ...

-0.605***
(-5.1017)

-2.3.440**
(-1. 788)

31.704
( 1.3050)

0.56

7 . 08'' '

0.0245
( 1.0732)

-0.626***
( -5.2247)

-2.3.999**

47.02.3*

o. 59

5.94 •••

-0.00786
(-0.4688)

0.8253'
() .510))

33.0217'

o. 23

1.23

-0.1785
(-0.5873)

-3.8888
(-Q.I201)

0.08

0.35

----

(-1.8355)
( ).6731)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(41
1974-1978
- 23.988
- 0 . 00505
--0.8.314*
35.461'
33.940
0.2)
(-0. 7756)
I. 50
(-0.3202)
--(1.5457)
( 1.6044)
(0.8054)
(5)
1974-1978
-4 0.409
o. 3762
0. 7865'
29.5514'
-56.1358
(-1. 1706)
0.22
I. 54
(0.4535)
( 1.4824)
() .3903)
--().2349)
(6)

) 974-1978

47.944

().4442)
(0.969))
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·--------------1969-1978
- 59.2 23
0.00777
--0.1662
-4.0877
76.0723
0.08
0.45
(-1.1984)
co . 5056)
-c-0.5766l
(-Q.I292l
( 1.1846)
(8)
)969-1978
-50.8536
o. 1257
-0.16)0
-3.35)4
66.1670
--0.07
0.40
(-1.0450)
(0.2722)
(-Q.5443l
(-Q.I055l
().0519)
-(7)

(9)

)969-1978

(-1. 11 22 l

NOTE:

0.007204
(0.4480)

11 11
t st~tlstlcs are shown In p~rentheses below the estlm~ted coefficients.
lndlc~te slgnlf l cance at the 0.10, 0.05, ~nd 0.01 levels, respective ly .

81.0701
(I. l228l

Superscripts •,

..

, and •••

~

TABLE 11

Sl.HIARY OF ESTIMATilD REXiR&SSIOO ~ATIOOS (CXXJNfY DATA)
Dependent Variable:

Eq.
(1)

Per I od

1969-1974

6 Total CropiMd

Constant
-8.9419
(-1. 1683)

(2)

1969-1974

-7.0739
(-0.9990)

01

1969-1974

-8.6263
(-1.0877)

Popu ~lit I on

----0.002752
(0.0217)
- 0.0374
(-0. 2418)

6.

Nonagr 1cuI tural
Income

0.003579
(0.4124)

--0.0050
(0.4699)

6

Net
fllrm
Income

Lllnd
Control
Ounmy

-0.2511*••

Land

Ratio

R2

(-4.2256)

-5.7169
(-0.8923)

8. 5671
<0. 6849)

0.46

4.69 111

-0.2486* ..
(-4.1823)

-5.9066
(-0.9201)

6. 2499
<0.5193)

0.46

4.62 111

-o. 2509•••

-5.7185

e. 1483

0.46

3.61 ..

(-4. 1327)

(-0 .8732)
<0.6316)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------............
(41
1974-1978
7.8155
-0.00663
--o.
4466*
24.3635
-5.2736
<0.6448)
0.29
(-0.90461
2 • .30*
(-1.6067)
-(2. 16641
11

<-o. 24551

----

(5)

1974-1978

3.00198
<0. 2200)

0.009474
<0.0241)

(6)

1974-1978

4. 9561
<0. 3595)

0.2042
<0.4656)

- 0.008345
(-1.0027)

(-1. 5718)

-0.8143

-0.08674

1-0.0466)

1- 0.4269)

-0 . 0006077
I-D.0923J

0.09787
10. 7404)

-o. 4862**

20.63.30) ..
(1.8551)

4. 0265
(0.1704)

o. 27

2.02

-o. 4469

23.7112 ..
(2.0552)

-o. 5999
<-D.0249)

0.30

1.82

11.5799
10.4082)

0.05

0.27

(-1. 7163)
1

------------------------------------------------------... ----------------------------------------------------1969-1978
-3.6342
--0.001665
0.08816
3. 5167
15. 1468
(-0.2289)
0.05
0.30
<-D.2779)
--(0.69)
<O. 2553 I
(0.5694)
(8)
1969-1978
-1.3763
-0.0938
0.09737
2.9579
12.3041
--1-0.0860)
1-0.5098)
0.06
0.35
<0.7545)
--<0.2147)
<0. 4619)
(7)

191

NOTE:

1969-1976

2. 9089
10.2062)

"t" stati s tics are shown In parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
lndlcote significance at the 0 . 10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectlvely.

SuperscrIpts •,

••, ond •••
<n
N

TABLE 12

SLMMARY OF ESTIMATED REXJRE:sSIOO EJQUATIOOS (CUJNI'Y DATA)
Dependent V~rlable:

Eq.

Per I od

111

1969-1974

121

1969-1974

6

Harvested Crop land

Constant

!::.

A Nonagr 1cuI

tun~ I

Population

Income

-11.1787
1-1.01241

----

-0.003J07
1-0.25311

-8.7052
1-0.85791

-o. 1575
1-0.83221
-0.1939
1-0 . 81951

0 .004304
10 .26721
-0.007801
1-1.29811

---

D1

1969-1974

- 9.8645

141

1974-1978

12.256
I 1.29061

----

151

1974-1978

12.0168
I 1. 14031

-0.2472
1-0.77641

161

1974-1978

12.990
( ( .22911

-0.06458
(-0. 17691

---

-0 .007189
(-1.0190 1

6

f~~:
Income

Land
Control

Land

Dumny

Ratio

0 • .39505 111
14.26701

B. 2337
10.83681

111.1787111 1

0 • .396.3 111

14.38281

7. 7681
10.80541

0 • .3958'''
14.24331

R2

0.65

10.15 111

107.1840 ...
14.23871

0.66

10.6'''

8.0605
10.81291

109. 1083
14.06771

0.66

B.D**'

-o.2269
1-0.95451

15. 1499'
!1.6030 1

-18.0548
1-0.90221

0.19

1.28

-0.2619
1-1.08671

12.8338'
(1.3650 1

-16.2951
1-0.74991

o. 15

o. 97

-0.22762
(-0.93591

15. 2881'
!1.57641

-19.4478
1-0.88681

0.19

o. 98

0.35

2.99 ..

0.36

2.32'

14.21031

------------------------------------------------------------------... --------------------------------------·------196<}-1978
!11
6. 5491
-0.005273
93.817 ..
9.8434
-2.86 ..
0.34
(-0.64251
10.31561
12.48951
10.51761
!1.83861
-0.4449

(81
191

NOTE:

196<}-1978
196<}-1978

9. 5155
(0.45711

-0 .2207
1-0.87961

-----

11.787
(0.52481

-0.1853
1-0.66161

-0.00284
1-0.31301

11

12.57821

8.4385
(0.44391

88. 7093 ..
( 1. 74481

0.4681 111
(2.53841

7. 9548
10.40841

84.6475'

0.4649 111

t 11 statistics are shown In parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

11

(1. 58171

Superscripts •,

••,

and •••

<.n

w
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data abov e the dashed lin e in each part of the table i s le ss meaningful
be cua s e of the c onsiderable differen c es in the size of agricultural
ar e a s amo ng t he states.

The key data r e ported is the average percent

change for the states in ea ch category.

This is shown below the dashed

1 ine in each part of the table, as are the standard deviations and "t"
statistics for testing for significant differences between the "with"
control and "without" control means.
Examining the "t" statistics reveals that four of the differences
have the wrong sign under the null hypothesis.

None of the differences

are signifi c ant at either the 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 probability levels.
Only one comparison is marginally significant and that is the comparison
for total farmland during the 1974-1978 period.

The mean percent change

for the "with" control group is 1.07 standard deviations below the mean
percent chang e for the "without" control group .

This difference is

significant at the 0.15 l e vel, but the si gn does not agr ee with the
hypothesized sign.

The evidence presented in Table 3 is, at best, mi xed

concerning the effectiveness of state agricultural land-use controls.
County Results
In Table 4 and Table 5, there are nine relevant compa r isons made
for the three time periods and for the three land categories.
analyzes county agricultural

1 and-use control effectiveness

corresponding to the time periods of Table 3.
wrong sign .

Table 4

One "t" statistic has the

This is for ha r vested cropland for the 1974-1978 period.

The results of Table 4 are more meaningful than the results of Table 3
because Table 3 does not consider the possiblity that while a state may
not hav e cont r ol legislat i on,

county or othe r local government units
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might.

Such local laws may be affecting land resource allocation, but

they are not being accounted for at the state level .
Table 5 presents data for three additional
available at the state level.

time periods not

In contrast to Table 3 and Table 4, all

of the "t" statistics have the correct sign under the null hypothesis.
Two of the differences are significant at the 0.01 level.
total

These are for

farmland and total cropland for the 1959-1978 period.

the differences are significant at the 0.05 level.

Three of

These are for

harvested cropland for the 1959-1978 period and for total farmland and
harvested cropland for the 1964-1969 peiod.
significant at the 0.10 level.
1959-1964 period.

One difference is

This is for total farmland during the

Of greater importance is that in each category and

time period the average positive percent change in the quantity of
agricultural land for the "with" control group exceeds that of the
"without" control group.

Furthermore, the average negative percent

change for the "with" control group is 1 ess than that of the "without"
control group.

With six of nine "t" statistics significant at a minimum

probability level of 0.10 and favorable average percent changes in the
quantity of agricultural land for the "with" control group, agricultural
1 and-use controls appear, for the most part, to be effective for the
time periods specified.
(1959-1978),

structural

However, when 1 coking at a 1 ong time period
changes,

such as those taking place

agriculture in the 1970's, may go unnoticed.
changes, subperiods are analyzed.

in

To capture the structural

While statistically of greater

importance, Table 5 is less meaningful than Table 3 or Table 4 since the
time periods analyzed do not all ow for structural change.
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To relate changes in th e quantity of agri cultural land solely to
the existence of agricultural land-use controls is lack i ng since other
factors may come into play.

Chapter V outlined a multiple regression

model to describe changes in the quantity of agricultural 1 and as a
function of severa 1 hypothesi zed exp 1ana tory vari ab 1es.

Results from

that model are discussed below.
Multiple Regression Results
State Results
The first approach explained changes in the quantity of total
farmland, total cropland, and total harvested cropland as a function of
the existence of agricultural 1 and-use controls.

This approach was

limited for it failed to consider other variables possibly influencing
agricultural 1and use.

Results from the multiple regression model are

summarized in Tables 6 through 12.

State regression results are

sullJTiarized in Tables 6 through 9, while county regression results are
summarized in Table 10 through 12.

Results pertaining to total cropland

are discussed for they are more important to the controversy surrounding
agricultural land conversion and land-use controls than total farmland
or harvested crop 1and (si nee the major extent of concern surrounding
agricultural land is centered on losses from the cropland

base~

Table 7 summarizes state regression results where the dependent
variable is the change in total cropland. Equations (1) through (3)
analyze data for the period 1969-1974 .

In equation (1), changes in

population is excluded as a possible explanatory variable due to
possible multicollinearity with nonagricultural income .

The "t"

statistics for changes in nonagricultural income, changes in net farm
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income, a nd the land-control dummy variable were not statistically
significant.

The estimated coefficient on changes in nonagricultural

income (-0.0003) implies that for every one mill ion dollar increase or
decrease in nonagricultural income, total cropland will decrease or
increase by 0.3 acres.
says

The estimated coefficient on net farm income

that for every one million dollar increase in net farm income,

total cropland will increase by thirteen acres.
The "t" statistics for government payments and the 1 and ratio are
significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.

The estimated

coefficient on government payments and the land ratio imp l i es that for
every one million dollar increase in government payments or a change in
the 1 and ratio of one-tenth of one percent, tota 1 farmland wi 11 increase
by seven hundred and twenty-nine acres or 888.7 acres, respectively.

In

equation (2 ), the results are not significant 1y changed by inc 1 udi ng
changes in population and excluding changes in nonagricultural income as
an explanatory variable.

The estimated coefficient for changes in

population implies that for every one thousand increase in population,
total crop l and will

increase by two hundred and eleven acres.

This is

opposite to the hypothesized sign on the estimated coefficient.

With

changes in population and changes in nonagricultural income included in
Equation (3), again the results are not significant l y different.

For

the period 1969-1974, changes in government payments and the land ratio
statistically best explain changes in the quantity of total cropland.
Different results are obtained for the 1974-1978 pe r iod.
changes

in

population excluded in equation

nonagricultural

income,

(4),

changes in net farm income,

With

changes

in

changes

in

government payments, the land-use control dummy, and the land ratio are
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statistica lly sig nif ica nt at the 0.01,
levels, respectively.

0.01,

0.01, 0.05 ,

and 0.10

The signs on c hanges in nonagricultural i ncome

and the l and-use control dummy are wrong under the hypothesis.

The

es timated coefficient for changes in nonagricultural income suggest that
for every one mi 11 ion dollar increase in nonagricultural income, total
cr opland will increase by thirty-eight acres.

Equation (5) excludes

changes in nonagricultural income and includes changes in population as
an explanatory variable.

The sign on changes in population does not

agree with the hypothesized sign, implying that for every one thousand
increase in population, total cropland wi 11 increase by 995 acres.
Changes in population and changes in nonagricultural income are included
as explanatory variables in Equation (6).

For the two periods 1969-1974

and 1974-1978, the percentage of total variation in the dependent
vari ab 1 e exp 1 a i ned by the independent v ari ab 1 es (R-square) ranges from
0.56 to 0.73 and the related F statistics are all significant a t the
0.01 or 1 ower probabi 1 i ty 1 eve 1 s.
The equations for the 1969-1978 period explain much less (the
va 1 ues of R-square range form 0.30 to 0.32 ).

Presumab 1y, the structura 1

changes that occurred in agriculture in the early 1970's result in poor
statistical results when estimating equations for the entire period.
Fortunate 1y, the dates of the Census of Agri cu 1 ture correspond rough 1y
with th is structural change.

The use of the periods 1969-1974 and 1974-

1978 di c tated by the avai 1 abi 1 i ty of data make some sense given the
changes that occurred about 1973-1974.
The coefficients on the land-use control

dummy variable are

consistently negative and are statistically significant only in
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equations (4) and (6) for the 19 74-19 78 periodJ 6

Using the se point

estimates as the best available, one could infer that in the "typical"
state, the existence of land-use controls resulted in a reduction in the
c ropland base of some 160-175 thousand acres during the 1969-1974 period
and 200-410 thousand acres during the 1974-1978 period.
is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
that the mode 1 is mi sspeci fi ed.

Of couse, this

The explanation for this may be

Rather than 1 and-use contra 1 s affecting

the rate of 1 and conversion, the reverse may be true.

The following

county regression results may provide additional insights .
County Resu 1 ts
Tab 1 e 11 sunmari zes county regression results where the dependent
variable is the change in total cropland.

For the 1969-1974 period, the

only "t" statistic of significance is for changes in net farm income at
the 0.01 probabi 1 ity 1 evel.

For equations (1) and (3 ), the sign on

changes in nonagricultural income disagrees with the hypothesized sign.
I n equat i on

(1 ),

the

estimated

coefficient

for

changes

in

nonagricul t ural income implies for every one million dollar increase in
nonagricul trual income for the period total cropland wi 11 increase by
approximately 3.6 acres.

The sign on changes in net farm income in

equation (1), (2), and (3) is incorrect.

An incorrect sign in eq uation

(1) implies that for every one million dollar increase in net farm

income, total cropland will decline by two hundred and fifty-one acres.
For the 1974-1978 period, the sign on changes in population and
changes in nonagri cultura 1 income agree with their hypothesi zed signs.
26 Jn the equations for total farmland and harvested cropland in
Table 6 and Table 8, the signs of the coefficients are also
pre dominantly negative, although most are not significant.
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For the two periods 1969-1974 and 1974-1978, R-squares range from 0.27
to 0. 46 (bel ow that for the state data of Table 7 ), and the related F
statistics are significant at the 0.01 probability level in equations
(1 ), and (2 ), and the 0.05 1 eve 1 in equation (3 ).
The equations for the 1969-1978 period, like those of Table 7,
explain much less (the values of the R-square range from 0.05 to 0.06).
For the period,

none of the "t" statistics are significant .

The

structural changes that occurred in agriculture in the early 1970's
resulted in poor statistical results when estimating equations for the
entire period for both county and state data.

This is more apparent, at

least from examining equation (7), (8), and (9), at the county level.
The coefficients on the 1 and-use control

dummy variable are

consistently negative for the 1969-1974 period, but statistically
insignificant, are positive for the 1974-1978 period and are significant
at the 0.05 probability 1eve l.
that

For the "typi ca 1" county, one may infer

the existence of land-use controls resulted in a reduction in the

total cropland base of some 5,700-5,900 acres during the 1969-1974
period and an increase in the cropland base of some 20-24 thousand acres
during the 1974-1978 period.
The results analyzed so far do not clearly point to either the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of land-use controls.
(7),

In Table (5),

(8), and (9) for state data, the "t" statistics for the land-

use control dummy are significant for nine of twelve equations covered
in the period 1974-1978.

In each case the sign is opposite to the

expected sign while the R-squares are poor for every category except for
changes in total cropland.
been ineffective.

At the state le vel, land-use controls have

In Tab 1 e (10 ), (11 ), and (12 ), the 1 and-use contra 1
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dummy variable has the correct sign in the 1974-1978 period for all land
categories.

The "t" statistics for that period are al 1 significant at a

minimum 0.10 probability level.
ranging from 0.15 to 0.30.

However, the R-squares are poor in

For the 1969-1974 period, the sign is wrong

on the land-use control dummy for total farmland and total cropland
while it is correct but statistically insignificant for total harvested
cropland.

The R-squares for the 1969-1974 period suggest that the model

better exp 1ai ns changes in the quantity of agri cul tura 1 1 and than for
the 1974-1978 period.

At the county 1 evel, 1 and-use controls are

statistically effective in the 1974-1978 period, however, the overall
model is weak. The remaining task is to summarize the overall results
obtained and the thesis in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The thesis is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of
agri cu 1 tura 1 1 and-use contro 1 s embodied in the 1 and-use contro 1 dummy
variable.

To accomplish this,

changes in the quantity of total

farmland, total cropland, and total harvested cropland {a subset of
tota 1 crop 1and) have been hypothesi zed to be exp 1 ai ned as a function of
changes in nonagricultural income, changes in net farm income, changes
in population, changes in government payments, the ratio of agricultural
land to total land area {the land ratio), and the land-use control
dummy. If controls have been effective, the sign on the land-use control
dummy should be positive and be statistically significant, at least at a
minimum 0.10 probability level.
At the state level, the regression analysis offers little support
for or argument against the notion that agricultural land-use controls
are effective.

Generally, the coefficients on the 1 and-use control

dummy are negative,
significant.
these results.

and where they are positive,

they are not

Those who support such measures will not be pleased with
The empirical results simply strengthen the theoretical

arguments against land-use controls presented in Chapter I.

Those who

view such interference- in the 1 and market as potentially damaging may
take some comfort.

One drawback to the state only approach is that it

does not take into account the possibi 1 ity of existing county
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legislation.

A county analysis, therefore, is required.

At the county level, the regression analysis offers some support
that agricultural

1 and use controls are effective.

This is for

the period 1974-1978 for total cropland and total harvested cropland.
Those who support such measures wi 11 be encouraged with these results.
Those who oppose such interference in the 1 and market wi 11 not be.
If viewed from the state level, the resource cost involved in
passing the agri cul tura 1 1 and-use contra 1 1egis 1 ati on and admi ni steri ng
it, even though it is ineffective, may not be trivial.

Costs are

therefore imposed upon society even though the controls are ineffective,
and they are not significantly influencing land allocation.

However,

the marginal cost of this legislation is probably small relative to the
misallocation costs imposed if the laws were effective.
At the county level with the contro l s being somewhat effective,
this stands in contrast to the theoretical conclusions reached in
Chapter I.

By not a l l owing society to freely determine the amount of

land to be allocated among the different la nd-use categories, society is
not able to maximize its welfare.

Therefore,

the controls are

effectively influencing land allocation but not necessarily suiting
society's best interest.
In conclusion,

there is 1 ittle if any economic justification for

agricultural

land-use control

agricultural

land-use controls is very limited.

current situation may be optimal.

legislation.

The evidence for
If anything, the

Advocates of 1 and-use controls have

all the legislation they want and are satisfied that agricult u ral
resources are being protected while at the same time the market is still
free to allocate land resources efficiently (for the most part) since
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the controls are not effectively influencing land allocation.
Ineffective laws may increase welfare if the marginal benefits that
advocates of land-use control legislation and the marginal benefits of
individuals comforted with the fact that the market is efficiently
allocating land, exceed the marginal costs (or administrative costs)
incurred in passing the 1egi sl ati on.

If the controls were effective,

society's welfare would be decreased when the marginal costs of an
inefficient land allocation, brought about by the land-use controls, are
accounted for.

Given the importance of the issue, only those arguments

based on scientific reasoning and solid empirical analysis concerning
agricultural land-use controls, should be entertained since the purpose
of any investigation should be to present the truth.
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APPENDIX
This appendix presents a brief summary of direct and indirect
agricultural

1 and-use controls for each state that responded to

information requests.

Thirty-nine of forty-eight states responded.

Alabama
The State of Alabama has no laws regulating land uses at the state
level.
California
The California Land Conservation Act of 1965 (otherwise known as
the Williamson Act) brought the state into the area of land-use control
regulation.

The act made clear that the preservation of a maximum

amount of t he 1 imited supply of agricultural 1and is necessary to the
conservation of the state's economic resources.

The act calls for the

state to discourage premature and unnecessary conversion of agricultural
lands to urban uses, recognizing that in a rapidly urbanizing state
placing conversion pressure on its agricultural lands, those
agricultural lands

have a definite public value as open space.

Under article 2.5 of the Wi 11 iamson Act, beginning on 1 January
1971, any county or city having a general plan may establish
agricultural preserves.

The preserves usually will have a minimum size

of one hundred acres, but this requirement may be lowered depending upon
the unique characteristics of the agricultural enterprises i n the area.
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The county or city that starts a pre serve may by contra c t limit the use
of the land for the purpose of preserving it for agricultural use .
Own e rs of land in the preserve are not required to sign the cont r act.
If they do, the 1 ength of each contract shall be for a term of no 1 ess
than ten years.

If a 1 andowner seeks to cancel

a contract,

the

landowner must seek board approval.
The Open Space Easement Act of 1974 brought together with
agri cu ltura 1 1 and, other types of 1 and to promote the preservation of
open space 1 and.

To promote the conservation, preservation and

continued existence of open space 1 ands, the 1 ands brought in are to be
valued for restrictions and current uses.
An inventory of prime agricultural land resources must be prepared
by the State Office of P 1anni ng and Research.

This will a 11 ow the state

to estimate the amount of prime agricultural land resources that must be
preserved to maintain the agricultural economy of the state and to
assure adequate and healthful food for future residents of the state and
nation.
Article 4 of the act stipulated that by 31 December 1973, every
city and county shall prepare and adopt an open-space zoni ng ordinance
consistent with the local open-space zoning ordinance that each city and
county has formula ted.
Col or ado
Differential assessment was the first state land-use control
legislation.

Adopted in 1964, the particular statute provides that

agricultural land shall be valued (exclusive of improvements) at a rate
of 11.5't of its productive capacity .

To be assessed as agricultural
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land, the land must meet the follow i ng requirements:

1) have been used

the previous two years and presently for monetary profit through
agricultural activities; 2) or be in the process of being restored
through conservation practices including resting, deferred grazing, or
fallowing; 3) and the land must have been classified as eligible for
classification as agricultural land during the 10 years preceding the
year of assessment; and 4) the land must continue to have an
agri cultura 1 use. 27
The Local Government Land-Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 gave
1 ocal governments (cities and towns) broadened power to regulate
development.

Th i s additional authority was provided so that local

governments could protect environmentally unstable areas and to regulate
1 and use on the basis of its impact upon the community and the
surrounding areaL

In 1975, cities, towns, and counties were authorized

by the state to adopt and regulate land uses through zoning.
Connecticut
In 1963, Public Act 490 was passed by the 1 egisl ature .

The act

declares that it is in the public interest to encourage the preservation
of farm land so that a readily available source of food and farm
products can be maintained close to the states metropolitan areas and to
prevent the forced conversion of farm land to more intensive uses as a
result of economic pressures caused by farmland property tax assessments
at values incompatible with the preservation of the farmland .
The act provides for the assessment of farm, forest, and open space
27colorado, Department of Agriculture, Inventor~ of Existing
Co 1or ado Law Re 1ated to Agri cu 1 tura 1 Land Preservat1 on (1 BIT, sec 3, p.
56 .
------
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a t its use value ra th e r th a n its c ur r e nt market valu e.

Public Ac t 152

imp ose d a percenta ge fine on agricultural 1 and, held under Public Ac t
490, whose use is changed.

Th e ta x ranges from ten percent of the sales

pri ce if the land is sold during the first year of acquisit i on or
c lassification, whichever is earlier, declining one percentage point
each subsequent year unti 1 no conveyance tax is imposed i f the 1 and
remains open following the end of the tenth year of Public Act 490
c lassificat i on or ownership wh i chever is earl ier.28
Delaware
Del a ware's Conservat i on Easement Law was enacted in July , 1978.
The 1 aw placed 1 imitations , i n the form of restrictions, easements,
covenants, or by other instruments, on land uses and on the changes that
could take place for the purpose of protecting land or water areas
predominan t ly in their natural, scenic, recreational, or open condition
i n agri c ultural, farming , forest, or open-space uses.

More recently,

the Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Act of 1981 has been
enacted.

Under this act, state pol icy wi 11 be to conserve , protect, and

e nhance the agri cu 1 tura 1 ec onomic base of the state for th e production
of food , f i ber, and fuel.

The Delaware Department of Agriculture, in

cooperation with the Office of Management, Budget, and Planning, must
review data on the extent of farmland losses.

Policies and techniques

must be recommended by the two agencies to the governor to maintain
agriculture as an important and viable ec onomic activity.

28connecti c ut, Depa r tme nt of Agr ic ulture, Summary £!_Pub l ic Act 490
(1980 ).
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Florida
Florida has several statutes to slow the conversion of agricultural
county land to other uses.

Section 193.461 Florida statutes (The

"Greenbelt Law" enacted on 1 July 1959) calls for the property
appraisor(s) to classify all lands in the county for assessment purposes
as either agricultural or nonagricultural.
tax rate, with agricultural
nonagricultural uses .

Land use will determine the

use receiving a 1 ower tax rate than

The latest legislation is the "Right to Farm Law"

(Section 823.14 Florida Statutes).

This nuisance 1 aw (enacted 16 May

1979) states that a person moving next to an established farming
operation has no right to complain about noise, odors, etc. generated by
the workings of the agricultural operation unless it is injurious to
public health and safety.
Georgia
Senate Bill 348 passed in the 1980 session of the Georgia General
Assembly represents the state's only legislation pertaining to the
preservation of agricultural
agricultural

1 and.

The 1 aw states that i f the

land in question was being farmed prior to the

establishment of the surrounding nonagricultrual uses, the agricultural
operation is not to be considered a nuisance.
Illinois
The state's legislative response to farm land conversion is
embodied in two pieces of legislation.

Public Act 81-1173 (The

Agricultrual Areas Conservation and Protection Act) took effect on 1
July 1980.

The act provides for the establishment of agricultural and

protection areas.

A county board may establish a county Agricultural
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Areas Committee whenev er a petition is recei ved by the county board for
the creation of an agri cultural area.

Any owner or owners of 1 and may

s ubmit a proposal to the c ounty board calling for the creation of an
agricultural area within the co unty.

An agricultural area at it s

creation , shall not be smaller than five-hundred acres, with the
territory as compact and contiguous as is possible.

Participation in an

area is voluntary with an initial time length of ten years .
When any part of a proposed agricultural area is within a 1-1/2
mile radius of the corporate 1 imits to a municipality, the county board
mu s t

notify the proper authorities in the muni ci pality .

If the

municipality objects to the encroachment of the agricultural area within
the 1-1 / 2 mi 1 e corporate 1 imit radius, the proposed area shall be
modified to exclude all area real estate from within the radius.

Once

in an agricultural area, an owner is not absolutely required to stay in
for the full time.

They may petition the county board for early

withdrawa l provided that the c ounty board is convinced by the owner's
pre-withdrawal agrument.
the a rea.

There exis ts no penalty for withdrawal from

If a 11 owners no 1 anger des ire to be inc 1 uded in the

agricultural area after the initial ten years, they may petition the
county board to dissolve the area.

Public Act 82-509 (November, 1981)

recognizes that, "It is the declared policy of the state to conserve and
protect and encourage the development and improvement of its
agricultural 1 and for the production of food and other agricultural
products ." 29

The Act is essentially a nuisance 1 aw stating that no

29I llinois, Dep ar tm e nt of Agriculture, Bureau of Farmland
Protect io n, Division of Natural Resources, Public Act 82-509 (1982).
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f arm, no r any of it s appu r t e nan ces, s ha ll be deemed a nu is an ce if th e
farm was considered not a nuisance at the t i me its operati ons began and
has bee n in operati on at the same site for more than one year regardles s
of any changed conditions in the surrounding area.
Indiana
Only recently (1981) the state passed a 1 aw with respect to
agriculture. The law is designed to limit the circumstances under which
agricultural operations may be deemed nuisance.

An amendment to the

1981 act was added during the 1982 legislative session, specifying that
for an agri cultural operat i on not to be deemed a nuisance, it must have
been continuous 1y in operation for at 1 east one year on the 1 oca 1 i ty.
During that one year, there must not have been any significant change in
either the hours of operation or in the types of operation .

The

operation must also not have been considered a nuisance at the time it
began its operation s on that locality.
Iowa
Iowa does not have state leg i slation aimed at preserv i ng
agri cultural land.

The state legislature is considering legislation.

Kansas
At present there is no statewide pol icy concerning agricultural
1and-use regulation.

There are several 1aws that may indirectly affect

agri cultural land use.

K. S.A. 19- 2927 (1951) allows counties th at have

either a f i rst, sec ond , or third c lass c ity located therein to impose
zon i ng regulation s within any unincorporated territory lying within
th ree mil es of any such ci ty to promote public health and safety and to

76
conserve and protect property and bui 1 ding values.

K.S.A. 19-2929

(1951) allows county commissioners the right to divide unincorporated
terri tory into districts to carry out the purposes of K.S.A. 19-2927 and
to regulate and restrict the construction, modification, or use of
buildings, structures, or land.
Maine
The Farm and Open Space Tax Law of 1975 represents Maine's
agricultural land preservation legislation.

The law provides for the

valuation of land classified as farmland or open space land based on its
current use as farmland or open space, rather than its potential fair
market value for more intensive uses other than agricultural or open
space.

Penal ties wi 11

be assessed for any 1 and-use changes

disqualifying land from the lower tax rate classification.
Maryland
Planning and zoning enabling legislation was adopted in 1950.

It

provided for local government autonomy in planning and zoning (conferred
pol ice powers).

Agricultural use property tax assessment was adopted by

the state in 1959.

In addition, this differential use tax was the first

of its kind to be established in the nation. Statewide property tax
credits for preservation 1 and were adopted in 1976.

Voluntary

agricultural districting was initiated in the Maryland Agricultural Land
Preservation Program in 1977.

State legislative action in 1980 resulted

in the adoption of a transfer of development rights program.
Massachusetts
The state acted in 1973 by signing into law legislation aimed at
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retaining a significant farmland base.

The Farmland Assessment Act of

1973 was designed to remove some of the pressure to sell farmland for
non-farm uses by permitting actively farmed land to be assessed and
taxed on its farm use value rather than its potential development value.
In 1977,

the Agricultural Preservation Restriction (APR) Act was

legislated to offer protection for farmland in the Commonwealth.

To be

eligible, agricultural land lots (1) must be at least five acres in
size, (2) have produced at least $100 per acre gross sales annually on
that acreage, and (3) have been in farming for the two consecutive years
prior to application.

It provides farmland owners the opportunity to

realize the value of the "development rights" of their property. 30 The
farmer capitalizes on the difference between the agricultural and nonagricultural development values by agreeing to place a permanent
restriction on his land prohibiting al 1 non-farm development and
allowing only for agricultural uses.

Participation in the program is

voluntary.
Minnesota
The state has enacted legislation addressing the financial
hardships faced by farmers by placing contraints on agricultural 1 and
use.

In 1976, the Family Farm Security Act was approved to help

normally ineligible farmers obtain credit to purchase farm real estate
by guaranteeing loans and differing interest payments.

Eligibility

requirements are numerous.
To preserve land in agricultural use in the seven-county Twin

-----3oM_a_s_s_;~husetts, Department of Food and Agriculture,
Farmland in Massachusetts (1982 ).

Saving
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Cities Metropolitan Area the,
was enacted in 1980 .

Metropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act

Parti c ipation is voluntary and the program i s

administered by 1 oca 1 governments which are required to plan and zone
the 1 and for agricultural use .

The farmer-1 andowner may apply to have

his or her land placed into an agricultural preserve upon completion of
the planning and zoning phase by local government.
agrees,

by written covenant,

to keep

indefinitely for a minimum of eight years.
result of one of two actions.

The farmer-landowner

land in agricultural

use

Leaving the program is the

Either the local authority has changed

the planning and zoning of land, thus, making it ineligible to stay in a
result of a farmer-landowner's desire to get out of the program.

In the

program or as either case, the land remains in an agricultural preserve
for at 1 east eight more years from the date that it is removed frm the
program.

There then follows a two-year period in which the farmer-

landowner may reverse their decision.

The act goes on to impose

property taxes on agri cultura 1 1 and based on the 1 and's appropriate
agricultural classification and value (differential assessment).
Right-to-farm legislation becomes effective on 1 January 1983.
1982,

In

the · Agricultural Land Preservation Act was enacted, stipulating

that state policy is to preserve land in agriculture and conserve its
1 eng-term use for the production of food and other agricultural
products.

This is to be accomplished by protecting agricultural and

other certain parcels of open space land from conversion, conserving,
and enhancing soil and water resources to ensure their long-term quality
and productivity, encouraging the planned growth and development of
urban and rural areas and by pushing for the ownership and operation of
agricultural land by resident farmers .
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Missouri
No laws exist directly regulating or restricting the uses of
agricultural land.
Legislature.

Two items are being considered by the Missouri

House Bill No. 1447 is an act establishing voluntary

agricultural districting within the state.

Any owner(s) of land may

submit a proposal to the governing body of any county for the creation
of an agricultural district, the main purpose of which is to protect
viable farmland.

When considering the formation of an agricultural

district, the county governing board must consider factors such as
county development patterns and needs before arriving at a decision.
The minimum size of a district will be one thousand acres with ten years
as

the

initial

time

length

for the contract.

Land within the

agricultural district must be used for agricultural production only,
with few exceptions a 11 owed.

Senate Bi 11 No. 537 is an act designed to

protect agricultural operations from nuisance suits under certain
circumstances.
Montana
The state of Montana does not have regulations directly relating to
agricultural land use.

Possible indirect legislation is contained in

regulations indirectly relating to agricultural land use in the Montana
code annotated Title 76 relating to soil

and water conservation.

Section 76-15-701 concerns the adoption of land-use regulations by
stating that the supervisors of any soil or water conservation district
will have the authority to formulate regulations governing land use
within the district in the interest of 1) conserving soil and water
resources, and 2) preventing and controlling erosion.

30
Pos s ible future legislation is embodied in the Montana Conservation
Districts Division (COD) Resource Conservation Plan, 1981-1985.
in land use are discussed in two objectives.
provision of local
production.

level

Changes

Objective A calls for the

incentives to keep productive land in

The Montana CDD will assist interested conservation

districts with the development of agricultural preserve programs.
Objective 8 calls for the COD to increase support for the preservation
of prime agricultural land.

To accomplish this, the CDD will encourage

conservation districts to incorporate agricultural land preservation
programs in their education and information programs.

This is meant to

aid farm and ranch organizations and real estate agencies desiring
agri cultura 1 1 and preservation.
Nebraska
There are no laws dealing with agricultural land-use regulation at
the state level.
Nevada
Legislation (NRS 361A) aimed at assisting agriculture was adopted
by the Nevada Legislature in July, 1975.
real

NRS 361A allows for reduced

property assessments for land devoted and maintained in

agricultural use.

The original intent of the law and constitutional

amendment was to provide an alternative to owners of agricultural and
open-space land in urbanizing areas.31

Land could be retained in

agri cultura 1 or open-space use instead of bowing in to urban deve 1 opment

31Nevada, Department of Agriculture, Analysis of Nevada's
Agricultural Tax Deferral Program (1982) NRS Chapter 101A.
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pr ess ure cau sed by hi gh pro pe rty ta xes based on the l and' s pote ntial
mark et va 1 ue.
New Hampshire
The State of New Hampshire has no regulations or laws favoring
agricultural

land use.

Several communities have adopted zoning

ordinances to deal with agricultural land use.
New Jersey
The state does not have any legislation relating to agricultural
land preservat i on.
level.

Most legislation i s embod i ed at the muni ci pality

Two bills are currently pending in the state legislature.

first is Senate bill No. 3233 introduced on 14 May 1981.
would authorize the creation of

The

This bill

state debt by the issuance of bonds in

the sum of $50,000,000.00 for the purchase of development easements on
farmland and to pro vi de state mate hi ng funds for soi 1 and water
con s ervation projects .

Senate Bi 11 No. 3479 concerns agricultural

development and farmland preservation.

The bill establishes the state

agriculture development committee and provides for the establishment of
county agriculture development boards which would provide for the
es tablishment of voluntary agricultural districts.
On 31 October 1980, a state study was released forwarding proposals
for agricultural land retention and a development program in the state.
The study recommended that a series of actions be taken to solidify the
agricultural 1 and base and the farming industry in New Jersey.
actions

are

to provide for 1) a state and

local

These

commitment to

agriculture by providing encouragement and assistance, 2 ) voluntary
parti c ipation i n limited te r m agri c ulture districts, 3) local
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i mplementat i on of land planning te c hnique s ,

4) compensation for

development r ights given up permanently, a nd 5) an interlo cking series
of activities that would provide for a system of checks and balances to
maximize the potential for the future of farming in New Jersey.
New Mexico
Recently, the state enacted into 1 aw 1 egis 1 ati on dea 1 i ng with the
issue of agricultural land preservation.
passed a right-to-farm bill

In 1981, the state legislature

(Senate Bill 408), the purpose of which is

to conserve, protect, encourage, develop, and improve agricultural 1 and
for the production of agricultural commodities and to reduce losses from
the state's agricultural resources by stipulating under what conditions
agri cu 1 tura 1 operations may be deemed a nuisance.
New York
State agricultural land-use legislation came into existence in
1971, with the Agricultural Districts Law.

That law stipulates it is

the declared policy of the state to conserve, protect, and to encourage
the development and improvement of its agricultural
production of food and other agri cu 1 tura 1 products.
length for a district is eight years.

lands for the
Typic a 1 contract

Every eight years, the

agricultural district must be reviewed, and if strong demand exists for
non-farm uses, the district may be reduced in size or eliminated.

Lower

use value assesments associated with agricultural land use are available
to farmers by keeping their 1 and in agricultural

production.

Farmers

not located in the original agricultural district are also eligible for
ta x relief through differential use value assessment.

These farmers

sign a committment stipulating that they will remain in farming for

33
eight years.

Ta x penalities are to be imposed upon farmers desiring

withdrawal from the agricultural districts .
North Dakota
No state level legislation regulating the use of agricultural land
exists currently.

Several counties do, however, have some zoning .

Ohio
The Current Agricultural Use Valuation (CAUV) Act became effective
on 26 July 1974, with rules effective beginning with the 1975 tax year.
Under CAUV, landowners may have their land assessed at its use value for
agricultural purposes rather than the current market value.

Recent

legislation has greatly expanded the extent of agricultural land-use
controls and regulations.

Sub S.B. 78 calls for the establishment of

agricultural districts to preserve land in agriculture exempting land in
the districts from the collection of specified utility assessments, the
provision of additional benefits to land in those districts, forbidding
county and township zoning from restricting certain farm markets, and
provides l andowners the right to farm by excluding generally accepted
agricultural practices from air pollution laws, certain nuisance
statutes, rules, and ordinances.
Any person who owns agri cultura 1 1 and may app 1y to have their 1 and
placed in the district by meeting several

qualifying factors.

Withdrawing land from a district during the five (5) year contract time
subjects the landowner to a withdrawal penalty to be calculated by the
county auditor.

Oklahoma
Legislation was adopted in 1972 concerning the valuation of
property for taxation purposes.
on 1 October 1980.

Right-to-farm 1 egis 1 ati on was adopted

The Oklahoma Feed Yard Act of 1981 may be considered

an extension of the 1980 nuisance law.

In that law, special emphasis is

placed on the conditions for a feed yard not to be considered a
nuisance.
Oregon
The effective farm use (EFU) zone was developed by the legislature
in 1961.

Also in that year, the farm tax deferral program was begun.

The zones are used in rural farm areas and their primary purpose is to
provide an area where farming can take place free from interference.
However,

it is

recognized that EFU zoning substantially limits

alternative uses of agri cul tura 1 1 and.

Therefore,

and priv i leges are to be provided for farmers.

various incentives

Some of these incentives

and privileges are 1) assurance that only compatible nonfarm uses will
be allowed within the EFU zone, 2) nuisance or right-to-farm
legislation, 3) no minimum income requirement to be earned in three out
of the five preceding ca 1 en dar years to qua 1 i fy for speci a 1 farm-use
assessment, and 4) farm use valuation for inheritance tax purposes.

The

major extent of legislation passed occurred in the mid 1970's, when the
Statewide Planning Goals and Guide Lines were released by the Oregon
Land Conservation and Deve 1 opment Commission (LCDC ).
and fourteen

Goa 1 s number three

(enacted December 1974) are especially relevant to

agricultural land use.

Goal number three calls for agricultural lands

to be preserved and maintained for farm use, consistent with existing
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and future needs for agricultural products, forest, and open space.
addition, EFU zoning coverage was substantially expanded on.

In

Goal

number fourteen ca 11 s for urban growth boundaries (UGB) to be
established to identify and separate urban 1and from rural 1 and.

Cities

and counties are to cooperate in the establishment of the UGBs.

This is

to 1) assure orderly economic provision for public facilities and
services, 2) meet LCDC goals, and 3) to encourage development within
urban areas before conversion of rural areas.
Pennsylvania
There exists a wide variety of laws through which the state can
influence and/or change land-use trends.
introduced in 1966.

The first law (Act) was

Act 515 enables Pennsylvania counties to covenant

with landowners to preserve land in farm, forest, water supply, or open
space by taxing 1 and according to its use value rather than the
prevailing market

valu~

Act 207 stipulates farmland is to be valued at

its use value rather than the market value for inheritance tax purposes.
If land use is changed within seven years after the death of the
ori gina 1 owner of the 1and, pen a 1 ties may be imposed.
Zoning was legislated into existence in 1968 by Act 284, which
authorized local municipalities to establish zoning ordinances for the
"protection and preservation of natural resources and agricultural land
and activities".

Legislation passed into law in 1968 allows the state

and its counties to acquire land through purchase, contract,
condemnation, or gift so that they may preserve, acquire, or hold land
for open space use including farming.
Act 71 (1976) exempts farmers from being charged for municipal
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improvements,

such as the installation of water and se wer 1 ines.

Landowners may petition for the creation of agricultural areas to local
government(s) through Act 43 (1981 ).

These val untary agricultural areas

would have a minimum size of five hundred acres of viable farm land.
Various incentives to keeping land in and disincentives from
transferring land out of the area are provided for in the act.
Rhode Island
---The state's legislation consists of two acts.

In 1980, the Farm,

Forest, and Open Space Ac t was passed by the General Assembly.

The act

recognizes that as the protecter of the pub 1 i c interest, the state must
encourage the preservation of farm, forest, and open-space land in order
that an available source of food and other farm products is maintained
close to the state's metropolitan areas.

The state must actively seek

to prevent the forced conversion of farm 1and, forest, and open space.
To achieve the goal of preventing forced conversion, the state is to
employ use value assessment of land.

Use value assessment is based on

the current undeveloped value of the land rather than the "highest and
best use possible."
To qualify as farmland, land parcels must be larger than five acres
in size and should be actively devoted to agricultural use.

If the land

is taken out of the program and/or is developed, the farmer is then
subject to a development and land-use change tax.

The amount of the tax

is a percentage value of the fair market value of the developed land,
and it is only estimated at the time when the land is either ineligible
or is voluntarily withdrawn from use value assessment.

Act H5691

(Farmland Preser vation Act of 1981) instead of vaguely suggesting that
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the state must preserve agricultural land and prevent forced conversion,
suggests that the state acquire the development rights of existing
farmland to insure that there will be an adequate amount of land for
farming, open spaces, and ground water recharge areas.
South Carolina
The state has no laws pertaining to land-use regulations in
agriculture. Several 1 aws provide incentives to retaining 1 and in
agricultural production.

In 1980, a state law colllllonly referred to as

the "Righ-to-Farm Law," was passed. The 1 aw was passed by the General
Assembly to protect farmers from undue hardships such as nuisance suits
resulting from the normal every day operations of a farm.
Act 208 (1975) calls for a use value assessment for property taxes
on farmland.

The tax is based on a four percent assessment of the fair

market value for agricultural use.

Once the farm landowner has applied

for and is receiving the preferential assessment treatment, a decision
to change the land use to some nonagricultural use activity will subject
the owner to "rol 1-back taxes" for the year that the changes takes place
and for the five years preceding

i~

South Dakota
---According to the Division of Conservation of the South Dakota
Department of Agriculture, no agricultural land-use legislation exists.
Texas
The state recently (5-13-81, Senate Bill 488) enacted into law a
"Right-to-Farm Act" that ensures the right to farm by providing for
limitations on nuisance actions, regulations, rules, and zoning
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requirments concerning certain agricultural operations.

No nuisance

action shall be brought against an agricultural operation which has
lawfully been in operation for one year or more prior to the date of
such action, where the conditions or circumstances complained of as
constituting the basis

for the nuisance action have existed

substantially unchanged since the established date of operation.

The

act formulates a new state pol icy to conserve, protect, and encourage
the developement and improvement of its agricultural commodities.

This

implies that the state must make efforts to reduce agricultural resource
losses .
Utah
At the present time, no state laws or regulations regulating or
influencing the use of agricultural 1 and exist.
Vermont
State 1 aws / programs relating to the protection of farmland came
into existence in Title 24, Chapter 117 of the state laws.

Title 24,

Chapter 117 (1967) enables towns that have adopted a town plan and have
established a planning commission to enact zoning ordinances.

This

allows towns to include in their zoning agricultural use zones whether
they be exclusive or non-exclusive.

Use value assessment designed to

benefit 1 andowners who are wi 11 i ng to make a 1 ong term commitment to
keep their land in agricultural production, was added in 1977.

In 1980,

Executive Order 52 directed state agencies and state instrumentalities
to avoid adversely impacting the preservation of agricultural 1 ands
through their actions.

Right-to-Farm legislation was adopted in 1981.
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Virginia
In the last two years, Virginia has passed into l aw si x laws
dealing wi th the use of agricultural 1 and (four bi 11 s in 1981 and two in
1982 ).

House Bi 11 No. 1654 (3 March 1981) grants public bodies the

necessary authority to acquire or designate land for use as open space.
The land may be acquired by bequest, devise, gift, grant, or purchase
for not 1 ess than five years duration.

The bi 11 negates the use of

eminent domain rights to land acquired for the purpose of open space,
but it does not 1 imit the power of eminent domain in other cases .
House Bill No. 1428 (20 March 1981) is similar to legislation in other
states by declaring that state pol icy is to conserve, protect and
encourage the development and continued improvment of its agricultural
1 and for the production of food and other agricultural products.
goes

on to

redefine nuisance

It

laws with respect to agricultural

operations such that no agricultural operation, or its appurtenanc es,
shal 1 be deemed a nuisance due to any change of conditions in the
surrounding area if it has been in operation for more than one year.
This new nuisance interpretation does not affect the right of any
person, corporation, or firm to seek payments resulting from orignial
damages sustained by them.

House Bill

No . 1656 (21 March 1981)

encourages 1 ocal governments to create comprehensive plans to improve
public health and safety and plan for the preservation of agricultural
and forestal land.

Zoning ordinances and districts are to be drawn with

reasonable consideration to any existing land-use plan, current land-use
trends and designed 1 and-use patterns, with the goal of assuring the
"most appropriate" use of land throughout the county or municipality.
Chapter 3.2 of House Bi 11 No. 1655 (2 Apri 1 1981) deals with the
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preservation of prime agricultural 1 and .

It is pointed out that the

actions of various state agencies account for a significant portion of
the prime agricultural land converted to nonagricultural use.

To stop

this wherever possbile, state policies and actions should encourage the
preservation of prime farmland.
House Bi 11 No. 523 (9 February 1982) is a House Amendemnt to H.S.
No. 1655.

Prime agricultural land now is referred to as "important

farmlands," which can be broken down into prime farmland, unique
farmland, and farmland other than prime or unique farmlands.

Under

Senate Bi 11 No. 355 (19 February 1982 ), an agricultural and forestal
districts advisory committee was established to review requests for the
formation of agricultural or forestal districts.
districts is voluntary.
five acreL

Participation in the

Minimum size of a district parcel is twenty-

The intial district contract length is for eight years, but

landowners no longer desiring to participate in the district may file a
written notice of termination with the local governing body which
created the district.

A withdrawal tax penalty exists in that real

estate previously included in the district is subject to roll-back
taxes .
Washington
Wahington's first legislation was the Open Space Taxation Act of
1970.

Under this act, a voluntary incentive program would be developed

to assess eligible farm, timber, or open space lands at their current
use value rather than at their highest and best value. Amendments to
the Open Space Taxation Act were added on in 1973. Additional laws were
enacted in 1979.

They were the State Inheritance Ta x 1 aw (Ch. 209, Laws
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of 1979), the Farmland Assessment Relief Law (Ch. 84, Laws of 1979), the
Nui sa nce Law (Ch. 122, Laws of 19 79), and the Boundary Review Law (Ch.
142, Laws of 1979).

The State Inheritance Tax Law allows current use

valuation rather than fair market valuation for closely owned family
businesses and farms.

The Farmland Assessment Relief Law was designed

to discourage the spread of certain urban type improvements onto open
space agricultural land .

The Nuisance Law states that agricultural

activities conducted on farmland,

if consistent with established

practices and established prior to any surrounding nonagricultural
activities, will be considered reasonable and will not constitute a
nu i sance unless they jeopardize public health and safety.

The boundary

Review 1 aw states that when considering annexations, Boundary Review
Boards must take into account the existence and use(s) of agricultural
soils.

More recently, cities and counties have been granted the power

to implement land

plannin~

West Virginia
The state passed legislation dealing with preserving land in
agricultural use

in H.B. 1109 (July 1981 ).

The act is designed to

grant inheritance tax relief to inheriting family members of a farm
where the principle owner has passed away.

The tax will be assessed on

the current use value rather than the fair market value of the property.
H.B. 1216 (May, 1982) allows county commissions the option of developing
and implementing farmland preservation schemes with voluntary
participation in the program.

H.B. 2020 (June, 1982) stipulates that it

is the state's duty to preserve and protect agricultural production as
it is a necessity to the welfare and common good of the state's citizens.
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Nuisance suits cannot be brought against agricultural operations unless
the complaintants land-use existed before the neighboring agricultural
production operations began and if the conduct of the agricultural
operation being complained about has or will cause actual physical
damage to the complaintant or the complaintant's property.
Wisconsin
State concern about agriculture resulted in the passage of the
Farmland Preservation Act on 29 June 1977.

The a act was passed to

assist local people who want to preserve farmland, and to provide tax
relief to farmers who participate in the local programs.

It is a two

stage bill, with stage I to run from 1977 to 1982 and stage II from 1982
and on.

Under stage I, farmers can qualify for tax credits against

their state income tax in two ways; 1) i f their land is zoned for
exclusive agricultural use or 2) by signing a contract agreeing not to
develop their land for a specified period of time.
The income tax credit is based on household income.

The lower the

particular farmer's income, the higher the tax credit, implying an
inverse relationship between the farmer's income and the tax credit.
Property taxes up to $6000 are eligible for tax relief.

If the farmer's

parcel is eligible for stage II but the farner chooses not to participate
in the plan, then they must pay back the credits received through stage
I.

Under stage II, farmers may qualify for income tax credits without

having to sign a contract by participating in exclusive farm-use zoning,
provided that the local zoning meets the standards in the law for
protecting farmland. Stage II imposes penalites upon farmers that do not
review their contract, in that if the contract expires, the farmer(s)
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must repay the tax credits granted in the previous ten years in two
ways; 1) pay back in a year of contract nonrenewa 1 and face no interest
or 2) pay later and face a six percent interest charge .

Tax credits

after 1982 will only be available to those farmers whose land is in
exclusive agricultural use or in an approved county plan preservation
district.
Wyoming
The state of Wyoming does not have specific laws relating to
agricultural land use.
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